In September 2007, the European Commission introduced the third package of legislative proposals aimed at the EU internal energy market and his further liberalisation. In the centre of the Commission’s attention are primarily wider possibility for the consumer to choose a supplier, fairer prices, environment-friendly energy production and the security of supplies.

The reason for the introduction of new proposals is the Commission’s statement that the absence of internal market is caused by market fragmentation along national borders, a high degree of vertical integration as well as market concentration (1).

The historical background of the proposals

The Commission’s endeavour to establish a single market dates back to 1996 when the first directive on joint rules for internal market with electrical energy (96/92/EC) was adopted. This directive was followed by the directive on earth gas in 1998 (98/30/EC). In both cases it was required that the owners of network assets created separate accounts which would have covered activities connected with the “network business” and thus earmarked all other activities as wholesale and retail. Since the Commission came to the conclusion that these steps were insufficient for the establishment of a functional market with electricity and gas, the revision of directives and the co-called second energy package was under way in 2003. That required that network activities were earmarked into an independent company, although this could have been owned by a mother company handling wholesale and retail. Like the majority of political documents adopted by the EU authorities, also both energy packages were the result of compromises. In the course of the transposition of directives to individual national legislatives, a shift in the accent was under way and each country applied general standards in accordance with its habits. The result of this process was the existence of individual more or less “national” markets with limited competition and not a single European market. (2)

European Commission’s objections to the persistent development

It was not earlier than January 2007 that the Commission released an assessment report in which it identified the main problem areas of European power engineering which even the second package of proposals failed to deal with. According to the assessment the major drawback was the fact that established gas and electricity companies maintained to a large extent a dominant position on “their” national markets. (3) For the first time two sentences appeared in the report that characterised the Commission’s stance on the separation of network operation from production and distribution.

In the case of earth gas the lack of liquidity and a restricted access to infrastructure, which limit new suppliers as for the provision of services, have proved to be further obstacles to the establishment of a single market. Also long-term contracts signed between mining companies and consumers are criticised. The gas infrastructure (pipelines and storage tanks) is predominantly owned by a consumer company and an insufficient separation of this infrastructure from gas supplies results in an insufficient market opening. The drawbacks mentioned appear despite ordinances on third parties (TPA – third party access) and legal unbundling.

As regards electric energy the central Commission’s objections pertain to the vertical production integration, supplies and network activities in the hands of a single dominant company, unsatisfactory cooperation among distribution network operators, inconsistent rules in terms of electricity market and network access, information deficiency and market transparency.

The Commission strives to ensure by means of the new package of proposals that the countries’ energy market becomes open for consumers from other countries and domestic companies equally. According to optimistic assumptions of the Commission the consumers could chose suppliers on the basis of personal preferences, i.e. they could decide whether to give preference to green energy or better customer service, or the price is the primary motivation. The objective isn’t to secure gas and electric energy supplies on the basis of trust, but in accordance with real market conditions.
According to the Commission the insufficient legal unbundling is perceptible in three areas, namely the discrimination within the third party access principle, unsatisfactory access to information for new interested subjects and distorted investment environment. The third package of proposals is composed of three ordinances and two directives. The updates of the 2003/54/EC (4) and 2003/55/EC (5) directives on electrical energy represent the biggest changes within the development.

The existent lawful claims concerning legal and functional separation of network administration from production and supplies were carried out in individual states by one of two methods. The first one was the establishment of an independent company which ran the existent network. The second one was the earmarking of network assets into the division in terms of the existent and integrated company. The second principle, however, caused troubles, because there was a growing concern that there wouldn’t be the guaranteed undiscriminating third party access to the networks, but a preferred own legally separated division. The impossibility to secure undiscriminating access to information for third companies as well as the question of the networks’ investment needs also became a problem, because a vertically integrated company was not interested in investing on the condition that it would have helped third parties in this way. According to the Commission’s findings integrated companies invested in networks and new connecting pipes lower means than completely separated companies contributing thus to the safety of supplies. (5)

The Commission mentions in the draft directives also national regulators that, if they are strong enough, are the guarantee for a well functioning market. The regulators’ positions vary according to country. In some countries, they were established only a short time ago.

Proposals encompassed in the directives of the third energy package

Proposals offered in the third package can be summarised in several points:

– The ownership separation of production and distribution from distribution network (ownership unbundling): The network ownership and its operation must be separated. It means that the operation of the electrical and gas distribution network must be separated from the activities in the field of production and supplying. From the proposals clearly emerges that the Commission prefers in this regard the alternative of separated ownership, in other words, the same enterprise won’t be able to own the distribution network and to deal concurrently with production or energy supplying any longer. The advantage of such separation should be the loss of suspicion that the network operator will give preference to a concrete supplier.

– The Commission also suggests an “Independent System Operator” (ISO) as a second alternative which will enable the existent vertically interconnected enterprises to retain the network ownership, however, on the condition that the assets will be run in practice by a fully independent enterprise or subject. Both alternatives in question will give a fresh impetus for companies to invest in new infrastructure, interconnection capacities and new production capacity. Thus electric power cuts and useless fluctuations in prices will be prevented. This measure pertains to electric power as well as gas. Meanwhile, greater progress in ownership separation has been achieved in the electric power sector.

– Within the EU the Commission proposes that any company producing or distributing electric power or gas in some member state cannot possess a network operator in any other state. The same conditions are supposed to hold for domestic firms as well as companies outside the EU which want to put capital interest into network operators. This means that they have to meet equal requirements for the separation of production and supplying from distribution network. The Commission asks in the proposal that a contract is to be signed between the EU and the country from which the potential capital comes. This should ensure that the company abides by the principles of the entry of network operators like companies from member states do. This clause has been criticised particularly by the Russian giant Gazprom.

– The Commission suggests to reinforce state regulatory bodies the status of which is crucial due to the specificity of dealing in electric power and gas. National regulators primarily have to secure undiscriminating approach and must have access to important decisions too. The key principle is obviously their independence of main entrepreneurial subjects as well as the government.

– The Commission also proposes the establishment of an agency coordinating national regulatory authorities that should be in charge of cross-border trading in electric power and gas. The Agency is supposed to conduct a framework for the collaboration among national regulators and supervise the mutual cooperation among network operators as well.

– The Commission puts forward concrete steps in quest for an efficient collaboration between individual network operators. According to the Commission the strengthened collaboration would by easier if they were proprietary separated, because they wouldn’t pose a competition to each other. Although the Association of Distribution Network Administrators is to be formal, but also voluntary in contrast to the agency for regulators. Similar associations exist already. (ETSO, UCTE, NORDEL).

– Further Commission’s proposals are the support of cross-border cooperation, higher transparency and solidarity. (7)

New measures included in the third package are supposed to enhance the security of supplies predominantly through the establishment of security and emergency standards. In this way primarily electric power supplies will be secured and blackouts will be prevented, because this commodity “travels” faster than gas.

One of the important tools for the safeguard of liberalised internal market is the sufficiently strong and independent activity of national regulatory bodies. Power engineering is in this case specific, because from the historical point of view national monopolies were established the position of which the market itself wasn’t capable of enfeebling. That’s why the significance of regulators has been growing and specific conditions for their work have been set. Since it isn’t economically bearable to create alternative networks for gas and electric power supplies, the regulator has to ensure an effective and undiscriminating access to distribution networks for third companies. The new package proposes the strengthening of regulators by allowing them to issue binding decisions for companies, to undertake necessary steps in the case of insufficient functioning of gas and electricity markets and to fine companies which don’t fulfil regulator’s ordinances.

The negotiations about international affairs, this holds true primarily for cross-border trade, will be handled by the new Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators. As interconnections with enough capacity among individual countries are necessary for the establishment of a functioning market, this problem will be dealt with by the agency as the pivotal one. (8) The main condition for the origin of a single energy market is the sufficient capacity of cross-border interconnections and it is the deficiency of them which causes that the final consumers don’t derive such benefits like originally supposed.

The situation in Slovak energy sector

In Slovakia, a new market for companies was created on 1st January, 2005. Households have had this authority according to the directive 2003/54/ES since 1st July, 2007. Despite the formally declared market openness, the competitive environment hasn’t spread enough. The obstacle is, like it is the case also within other EU states, the dominance of established companies. Market openness is greater in the case of electrical power rather than gas. Slovenské Elektrárne (SE, joint-stock company) are the main producer with a market share approaching 84 per cent. (9)

The operator of electrical power distribution network (Slovenská elektrizačná prenosová sústava joint-stock company, – SEPS, joint-stock company) is from the proprietary viewpoint separated form the major producer and distribution companies, although not completely. The problem is that the owner of the distribution network is the state which has simultaneously a share in distribution companies as well as in SE joint-stock company as the primary electricity producer. (10) (11)

Graph No. 1
Ownership structure of the producer of electricity, transmission system and distribution

There are three big distribution companies in Slovakia (Západoslovenská energetika joint-stock company, Stredoslovenská energetika joint-stock company and Východoslovenská energetika joint-stock company) which have divided the country geographically. Since they don’t possess production capacity, they are dependent on the main supplier with whom they sign annual contracts. In Slovakia, there isn’t a developed functional and liquid electric power wholesale, because most of the distribution companies’ capacity isn’t conditioned by a contract with Slovenské elektrárne joint-stock company. It will be intriguing to monitor how the projects, according to which several new power plants are supposed to be built, will get on, however, not under the umbrella of SE joint-stock company. It is mostly gas fired power plants the building of which is planned in the area of the companies Slovnaft, U.S. Steel Košice and near Lučenec in the village of Panické Dravce.

Recently, there has been a competitive fight under way which is aimed particularly at industrial enterprises and companies that are financially more interesting than households. Other 18 companies were granted supplying licences. Among them is also the Czech ČEZ in the long-term development strategy of which is the foreign electric power market entry. Notwithstanding the market openness, there were just a few minor changes of electric power suppliers (approximately 1 per cent). (12) Limiting factor for the entry of alternative suppliers are the high fees for system services which solely Slovenské elektrárne are able to manage. It is this absence of competition which is the striking difference in comparison to, for instance, the Czech Republic.

Potential for the entry of new suppliers represents the growth of the demand for electric power on domestic market which will be accompanied by the shut-down of production capacity. (13) The largest lack of electricity is expected in the period from 2009 to 2012. The demand will have to be compensated by supplies from abroad, Ukraine looks as the most probable option. In this context it will be necessary to build an unconventional one-way electricity main in the territory of the Slovak Republic. A framework agreement on electric power supplies was signed by the Slovak PM Robert Fico and the Ukrainian PM Viktor Yanukovych in the end of August 2007.

Typical of the gas branch is the high dependence on a single external source of supplies and the dominance of primarily state-owned vertically integrated company SPP joint-stock company. In this field Slovakia is a strange phenomenon since there are only few countries which cover almost the entire consumption of oil, earth gas and uranium by supplies from a single country. The operator of gas distribution system was detached from the legal point of view in June 2006 – SPP Transport joint-stock company the name of which has changed for eustream joint-stock company since January 2008.

SPP is responsible for the whole of gas distributed in the Slovak territory and is at the same time the owner of distribution networks. In spite of the fact that there has been a legal detachment of the networks and the facilitation of entry for other suppliers as well, nothing has been put to practice so far and the Office for the Regulation of Network Branches (ÚRSO) hasn’t registered any claim yet.

There is a potential for new earth gas suppliers in Slovakia. The advantage is the proximity of the distribution centre in Baumgarten where three Slovak companies have been already registered. From among those Nafta joint-stock company belongs to active members. (14) Those companies, which take gas flowing across the Slovak Republic, could utilise a part of it for the supplying of Slovak consumers. Similarly to electric power, also in this field wholesale consumers are more interesting than households.

Objections against the Commission’s proposals

Objections against the proposed measures of the third energy package come from energy concerns in the EU, individual member states as well as Gazprom which took some of its articles personally.
Energy companies pay attention particularly to two things included in the discussion about what’s better – ownership unbundling or independent operator. They were the impetus why the Commission refrained from its uncompromising stance on ownership separation as the only option. Nowadays, discussion about both proposals is held. The main objective is that the proprietary separation of network operators will enfeeble the position of vertically integrated concerns in the course of negotiations with mining companies which needn’t fulfil this condition (they only have to if they want to acquire network assets). The separation of ownership from its administration would actually mean expropriation leading to price increase mainly of gas for final consumers. However, there would be no real competition, because rival companies would buy gas from the same supplier.

Energy companies also complain about the fact that the second energy package hasn’t been wholly implemented yet and another one already follows. The Commission doesn’t even consider the differences between earth gas and electricity. Gas has to face perpetual competition of other fuels and is imported from third countries. Electricity is produced directly in member states and not always from sources necessarily imported from abroad. Electricity as well as gas is traded though under similar but certainly different terms and conditions. From this point of view their integration into a single proposal is unfortunate, because not all the countries share the opinion on these commodities. In practice it mostly looks as following: the countries agree with the separation of distribution systems as for electric power, however, reject this with regard to earth gas supplies.

The worst critic of the part of the proposal, according to which the conditions valid for European companies should apply also to foreign companies, is Russian Gazprom. According to the company the Commission tries in this way to protect the internal market against the entry of new subjects which is in conflict with the declared market openness. The Russian giant has been interested in a capital entry into the largest British distribution company Centrica since 2006. However, the British Government has prevented this right owing to the endangerment of domestic energy security. From historical perspective the Commission’s requirement represents just an another form of proposals granting access of third parties to Gazprom’s networks which have been presented in the Energy Charter for many years. Anyway, Russian side hasn’t ratified it until now, because Gazprom would thus lose its monopoly on earth gas distribution in the country.

The commission justifies the ownership separation by the growth of investments that are prerequisite for sufficiently flexible interconnections. According to the Director General for Economic Competition Philip Lowe investments in infrastructure looked as following after ownership unbundling in Great Britain (15) (16):

Chart No. 1
Change of investment levels in the ownership unbundled British Gas Group

However, the figures presented above aren’t explained. It’s not clear what the finances were spent on. The factual investment growth is questioned concurrently. According to the SPP Chairman of the Board of Chairs the investments decreased by 25 per cent. (17)

In the Commission’s reports predominantly the cut of network fees and high investment level after ownership unbundling are highlighted on the example of Great Britain. This viewpoint is unilateral, because as the example serves a country with the most developed gas industry where regulation is different from other EU countries, competition is created by several suppliers and there are LNG supplies which make the market more resistant. The Commission’s proposals don’t take into account national peculiarities of the EU countries and therefore the current discussion about their final shape is needed.

Energy companies argue that there is no direct connection between ownership unbundling and the development of free and undiscriminating third party access to networks. According to SPP countries with legal unbundling and sufficiently strong regulation framework have comparable results as for the number of consumers which changed the supplier with countries where separated ownership exists. (18) From this point of view the improvement of the current condition would do. An analysis by the consulting company A.T. Kearney has come to similar conclusions. (19) According to the company it isn’t to be proved empirically that ownership separation leads to a more extensive competition. There is also no relation between the form of unbundling and prices, network tariffs, investment activities and network reliability. According to the analysis differences in the degree of competition on individual markets hinge rather on long-term experience with regulation than on how forcefully regulation and legal separation are pushed through.

According to the Head of the Regulation Council ÚRSO Jozef Holjenčík ownership unbundling in Slovakia, which was partially realised on 1st January 2007 with the aim of separating distribution from other activities, caused the increase of prices for final consumer. (20) Among the possible impacts of unbundling are the pressure on price growth, the increase of administrative burden, the drop of management efficiency in the aftermath of ownership multitude and problems with the reconciliation of new subjects’ strategic objectives. However, we have these experiences with electric power only.

In Europe, Hungary and Italy try to put into practice the alternative proposal of the Commission on the utilisation of an independent system operator (ISO). Nonetheless, both countries refrained from this concept after the vain pursuit of an arrangement which would motivate property owners as well as their administrators to close collaboration in terms of all areas. It’s a forceful symbiosis of two foreign companies with primarily different motivation. (21) Shortages appeared mainly in decision-making processes towards third parties but also in network administration. There was a conflict of competences and indifferent communication with regulatory and state bodies.

In its proposals the Commission focuses particularly on the high integration of distribution network with wholesale/retail and ignores the really high interconnection between wholesale and retail. (22) This point is the subject of criticism too, because it is the interconnection of production and distribution to consumers which will render the market open despite free access to networks. (23) If a retailer is proprietary linked with wholesaler, there is a risk that it will be preferred as a supplier. In such a case it doesn’t matter who will transit gas or electricity. That’s why it is momentous to concentrate also on the conditions of distribution and uphold the liberalisation of these areas too.

Graph No.2
Connection between the retail and wholesale

The Commission justifies its proposals also by means of the fall of gas transport fees, anyway, it doesn’t differentiate between transit and distribution in the context of unbundling. From the viewpoint of state-wide importance transit is more crucial and strategic. The costs of it, however, are lower and the transport accounts for only 3.3 per cent of the overall price for consumers. Distribution system is vital for final consumers. Nevertheless, local blackouts don’t have a state-wide impact. Therefore the proposed energy package won’t most probably be the last one and the Commission will strive to achieve a distribution liberalisation if this won’t be achieved thank to the work of regulators. Conceivable is also such a scenario according to which the third package would be attached to another one dealing with retail as well. Its efficiency will be thus delayed by several years. (25)

The question remains to what extent the changes proposed by the Commission are feasible. In all areas it is crucial to step up the Europe-wide collaboration and coordination, because on a single market, issues are common and malfunctions in one part of Europe are automatically carried into other parts. Simultaneously, the reinforcement of cooperation requires a certain form of centralisation and the loss of competences of national authorities. This is unacceptable predominantly for large EU countries.

The position of the Slovak Republic

The consequence of these objections is the negative attitude of Slovakia to current Commission’s effort. (26) Slovakia supported the letter addressed to the European Commission by the French Economy Minister Jean-Louis Borloo and signed yet by the representatives of Austria, Germany, Greece, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Latvia and Luxemburg. (27) This attitude may be the result of the discussion about the future of Slovak power engineering which was commenced in 2007. It might be at the same time affected by the position of German and French companies which participated in the privatisation of distribution companies (EdF, E.On, RWE, GgF) and SPP (E.On, Ruhrgas, GdF).

Slovakia rejects ownership separation within gas industry, but it doesn’t support an independent operator too. The main objection against the ownership separation proposal as well as independent operator (ISO) is the breaching of ownership rights. ISO is therefore not considered a fully adequate alternative to ownership unbundling.

Unsatisfied countries are supposed to introduce their own third proposal at the beginning of 2008. According to some statements it will be the so-called “regulated unbundling”, however, details concerning its difference form existent proposals are unknown.

Market liberalisation achieved via ownership separation or regulation ordinances will help to increase competition on individual markets. Nonetheless, further condition is the development of cross-border transport capacities. As for electric power transport, Slovakia needs to step up the capacity towards Hungary and to build a new connection to Austria and Poland. For the possible import of electric power from Ukraine it is necessary to construct a new main which will meet technical standards for its import. In terms of cross-border affairs Slovak Regulatory Authority lacks competences in accordance with valid legislation. For earth gas supplies it is needed to raise the capacity of the connection with Austrian Baumgarten from which new suppliers can import the raw material. Meanwhile, its price is higher than that one of Russian gas in this distribution point, however, the differences are going to shrink owing to the expected growth in the future.

At present, a discussion is held that has been joined by all relevant parties and the result of which should be the choice of the most suitable scenario for Slovak energy sector. If it comes to the establishment of independent system operators which would remain in the ownership of energy concerns dealing in production or distribution, or if the pushing through of legal unbundling was thorough, more emphasis would be laid on regulatory bodies as well as their competences and the strongest effect possible would be reached in this way. Regulatory body has to create favourable conditions for the entry of new suppliers of earth gas as well as electric power. In this context the most crucial thing is its independence and orientation towards maximum benefits for final consumers. The separation of electric power distribution network ownership exists already in Slovakia. More questionable is earth gas which will be the subject of main debate. The attention must be paid also to further steps which will follow. A discussion coping with the future of retail segment and its optimum structure must be held. In this case it would be better to separate the proposals on gas and those on electric power in order to avoid misunderstandings.

Slovenia, which took the EU presidency in January 2008, said that it would pay thorough attention to power engineering issues. It would strive to acquire new proposals from countries not content with current Commission’s concept. France, i.e. the country which is against the ownership separation, will take over the EU presidency after Slovenia. There is a threat that during Slovenian presidency the process will be delayed and in the course of French one the proposals will be rather curtailed so that they are acceptable for the majority of countries. If this is the case then the idea behind as well as the desirable effect will be lost or even worse, the coordinated process of the establishment of a single market might be terminated, because the coordination will be achieved somehow, or rather, no matter how.

The acquisition of more gas suppliers must follow as a supplement to internal liberalised market.  However, this is restricted by the geographical distribution of resources. Nowadays, there is just a single region in the EU’s range which doesn’t supply it with gas, namely the region of the Caspian Sea and Iran. This should change through the construction of the Nabucco gas pipeline. The expansion of trade in liquefied gas LNG, for which it is necessary to build enough terminals, follows. Four suppliers (Norway, North Africa countries, Russia and the Caspian region) and developed LNG supplies stand for the optimum supplier mix under the current circumstances for the EU.

Slovakia has to step up its activity in order to participate in such projects like Nabucco. Since mostly private companies are in the consortium, one of few possibilities seems to be the political support through the joint attitude of the EU which should have the form of financial guarantees of the project. Power engineering isn’t a sector which is based exclusively on economic principles. One has to be aware of the fact that the security of supplies is a financially demanding task. Among the prerequisites is also the coordination of all units of state administration which see to security and raw material supplies, i.e. the Defence Ministry, the Economy Ministry and the Foreign Affairs Ministry.

Submitted proposals like those concerning liberalisation and diversification represent solutions for the next 15 to 30 years. A long-term solution is the utilisation of renewable resources to maximum but at the same time efficient extent as well as the identification of the most suitable resources for individual countries. In the future, there will be a transition form the utilisation of current external energy supplies to the utilisation of local sources for whose Slovakia has enormous potential.

Notes:

1)http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/sk/com/2007/com2007_0529
sk01.pdf

2)     Šolc, P.: 3. energetický balíček Evropské komise z pohledu provozovatele přenosové soustavy, pro-energy magazín, http://www.pro-energy.cz, 2007

3)     http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/sk/com/2006/com2006_0841
sk01.pdf

4)     http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/sk/com/2007/com2007_0528
sk01.pdf

5)     http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/sk/com/2007/com2007_0529
sk01.pdf

6)     http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/sk/com/2007/com2007_0529
sk01.pdf, s. 5.

7)     http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/07/1361
&format=HTML&aged=0&language=SK&guiLanguage=en

8)     http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/07/
362&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en

9)     http://ec.europa.eu/energy/energy_policy/doc/10_internal_market_
country_reviews_en.pdf, s. 147.

10)  Podiely štátu: SE, a.s. – 34 %, ZSE, a.s. – 51 %, SSE, a.s. – 51 %, VSE, a.s. – 51 %.

11)  Similar problem is being solved also in the Czech Republic. According to their proposals the ownership separation will be considered accomplished on the condition that ČEPS (the owner of the distribution network) and ČEZ comes under different ministries and their managing structures are modified (one ministry cannot be represented in managing bodies of both companies). Hüner, T.: Energetická politika EU a třetí legislativní balíček, pro-energy magazin, http://www.pro-energy.cz, 2007.

12)  http://ec.europa.eu/energy/energy_policy/doc/factsheets/country/sk/
market_sk_sk.pdf

13)  Average annual electricity consumption growth is expected to be between 0.8 and 2.3 per cent in the period till 2030. Within the reference scenario with an average annual growth amounting to 1.6 per cent it represents in comparison to the year 2006 an increase by 13.5 TWh. That is nearly a 46 per cent growth in comparison to current electricity consumption. From a long-term perspective up to 2030 in view of the expected electricity consumption growth and the shutdown of existent production capacities, for Slovakia it will be necessary to secure around 6600 MW of new power output in order to cover the expected production deficiency accounting for approximately 29 TWh. Source: Návrh stratégie energetickej bezpečnosti SR. http://www.economy.gov.sk/clanok/go.php?id=3167, page. 84.

14)  https://http://www.gashub.at/downloads/CEGH_memberlist.pdf

15)  Lowe, P, Pucinskaite, I, Webster, W & Lindberg, P (2007): ‘Effective unbundling of energy transmission networks: lessons from the Energy Sector Inquiry’ Competition Policy Newsletter, no 1, Spring 2007, s. 147. http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/publications/cpn/cpn2007_
1.pdf

16)Among cases, by means of which the unbundling processes are justified, the description of gas market in the United Kingdom appears in particular. In the country, this process has begun in 1997 when the distribution division of British Gas, an integrated company privatised in 1987, became a part of the company Centrica, which has remained the largest distribution company until now. In 2000, the gas network division became a part of the company Lattice, which merged with the electric distribution system creating the company National Grid Transco in 2002. In 2005, the British distribution network was divided into eight regions four of which were sold at the suggestion of the regulatory body. That’s why we can speak of ownership unbundling of network assets yet after 2000.

17)  http://www.sfpa.sk/dok/PDFI/PBoucly.pdf

18)  http://www.energyforum.sk/upload/prezentacie/liberalizacia/SPP_
Studenec.pdf

19)  http://www.atkearney.de/content/veroeffentlichungen/whitepaper.php/
id/50145

20)  http://www.sfpa.sk/dok/PDFI/JHoljencik.pdf, s. 24.

21)  Šolc, P.: 3. energetický balíček Evropské komise z pohledu provozovatele přenosové soustavy. Pro-Energy magazín, http://www.pro-energy.cz, 2007

22)  Thomas, S.: A critique of the European Commission’s evidence of the need for ownership unbundling of energy networks, July 2007, http://www.psiru.org/reports/2007- 09-E-Lowecritique.doc, s. 4.

23)This is the situation in the Czech Republic where the major electric power producer is the company ČEZ which supplies energy to the majority of consumers through its daughter distribution companies.

24)  http://www.sfpa.sk/dok/PDFI/JHoljencik.pdf, s. 14.

25)  In accordance with the estimates the proposals may take effect in 2010. However, they will have to be adopted by the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament.

26)  Power engineering: Six countries have been protesting against the reform proposed by the Commission. EurActiv.sk, 01.08.2007. http://www.euractiv.sk/energetika/clanok/energetika-sest-krajin-
protestuje-proti-reforme-navrhovanej-komisiou

27)  There will be yet an animated discussion on energy liberalisation, EurActiv.sk, 28.11.2007. http://www.euractiv.sk/energetika/clanok/o-liberalizacii-energetiky-
este-bude-ziva-diskusia