If we want to be a part of civilised and modern society, we must patiently, indefatigably and almost infinitely adhere to peaceful methods and standards when solving world‛s burning issues and conscientiously abide by international law and respect the status of the UN. There is no doubt, however, that every country which finds itself jeopardised has an indisputable right to take adequate measures in order to secure its safety and defend itself. Difficult is to decide whether these measures are supposed to have solely military though protective (asymmetric) character, or a whole range of non-military alternatives is to be used (e.g. foreign policy, diplomacy, economy etc. with the involvement of UN, OSCE and other organisations). Nowadays, it is no more conceivable to deal with or even solve all world‛s issues by means of war. Diplomacy and dialogue represent the only way. “Even a won war is worse than imperfect peace.”
The fact remains that as early as 2002 the US began to keep to a doctrine which enables to unleash preventive wars (pre-emptive actions) without refraining from the use of nuclear weapons as first.
Also according to the National Security Strategy of the USA (NSS) the shift in orientation is distinct as to the traditional doctrine of intimidating for the sake of pre-emption. Following nuclear weapons, another document called U.S. Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) uses a new concept of the involvement of nuclear weapons in a set of conventional assault plans. It is often discussed in terms of the development of a new category of nuclear weapons for underground targets.
As a whole this orientation towards pre-emption is incompatible with the character of the UN Charter and the Collective Security System after World War II.
We may assume that the establishment of US extended anti-missile defence (ABM) in Europe is premature. There are still many other countries besides the USA that need information on launched missiles, among these are Russia, China, Japan, India, Pakistan, Turkey, Israel and others. Will the United States of America conclude a treaty on providing this kind of information also with other countries? This treaty is controversial and provocative from the viewpoint of talking the matter over neither with Russia, the US main partner, nor with NATO. Lastly, not only for Russia is it unacceptable.
As for the anti-missile defence, one could dryly say, but for thousands of American victims of September 11, 2001, that the Americans are not capable of protecting their own airspace, nevertheless, they offer flawed defence shield to a part of Europe and the world.
General Obering, the director of the American Agency, stated that Washington had intended to drum up the support of the twenty five NATO member states for the establishment of the “defence” shield in Europe, but it did not necessarily need their unequivocal consent.
Such an attitude, however, may stir up, and it actually does so yet now, dissension particularly among the Western NATO members. The condition in which two NATO member states are allowed to decide on a matter of importance and with impact on the whole of Europe and Alliance without cooperation and the consent of other members might cause crisis and it also highlights the absence of an efficient tool for the solution of such a situation inside the Alliance.
Those with global interests ten thousands kilometres off its territory have thus to position forces and means on territories which afterwards enable them to control the areas in question and intervene in them. One of the most important systems, apart from the combat ones, is the system of various types of radiolocation stations (ears and eyes) deployed on ground, in air, in space, but also under the sea level in pursuit of covering de facto the whole world.
How about the late establishment of NATO Missile Defence (it was not until 2004 or even 2006) and the fact that the European Union hasn‛t decided yet whether it builds its own system at all. Was it a mistake that enabled to start unilateral initiative of the United States of America on European territory? Or does it mean that NATO along with the EU has not identified, or rather, perceived the present state as potential risk? Only rarely did various thoughts of joint EU and CIS (Russia) missile defence occur. Obviously, we may understand the US to a certain extent, that as a bearer and promoter of the ideas of liberty, peace and democracy for the whole world it faces the largest and most complex potential threats from side of some countries. It is a result of the gradual increasing of the level of arm programmes in several countries rather hostile towards them.
The establishment of anti-missile defence is to be carried out in terms of the Collective Defence System within the EU, NATO, Russia and other countries by means of research, production and technological capacities and sources.
At first sight, the anti-missiles seem to have “protective” character and create the so-called “National Protective Shield” in order to protect solely from the bad, disobedient, rogue and terrorist states.
I want to deal with this issue from the viewpoint of three fundamental aspects, namely the geopolitical and energetic one, the political and military one and lastly the technical and military one.
Meanwhile, the National Missile Defence is built only in US territory (it is exclusively US defence programme, but with potential for others as well) and intercontinental ballistic missiles would be eventually destroyed several thousands miles away from American territory (the range of current anti-missiles is up to 3,125 miles; anti-missiles are medium-range and long-range rockets of strategic importance). If deployed in Europe (Poland and Czech Republic), they would be destroyed over the territories of other states, taking the direction east and south-east, among these states are Slovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, Italy, Turkey, Belarus maybe Ukraine or even Russia.
Why is the US interested in expanding their anti-missile strategy into Europe?
Are Poland and the Czech Republic the weakest or the strongest link of the European Union? Is also the idea of smashing the European integration the subject matter? Does it represent the weakening of European security architecture? Is the gradually uniting Europe an impediment, that blocks by its balanced continental policy the current American exploitation of the Middle East as well as the isolation of Russia? Why did such an offer for two European countries come right here and right now?
It is clear that the establishment of such an extended base is (meanwhile) just a bilateral matter between the US and Poland and at the same time the US and the Czech Republic. That means it is neither a treaty with Europe, nor even with NATO. According to the conclusions of American experts, when an intercontinental missile is successfully intercepted by an anti-missile, the diversion of the impact on particular targets is reached, however, the remains and combat sub-warheads which are not destroyed are likely to hit the inhabited parts (of Europe) wreaking severe contamination or toxicity and loss of life. Calculations show that in case of destroying a missile flying 2.5 miles per second, the distance covered during the rest of the flight (or rather fall) amounts to approximately 1¼ miles. At the speed of 3.5 miles per second, the distance would be around 3,100 miles.
It is to be reminded that in recent past, the US flirted with the idea of placing a radar in Hungary, but they refrained from it later. Hungary decided to say ‘yes’ to the construction of a radar within the NATO Anti-aircraft and Air Defence. The US, however, have been negotiating in pursuit of the extension of ABM to the territory of Great Britain, the extension of radar on Caucasus. In addition, negotiations with Israel are under way. These intentions are to be assessed geopolitically as well as strategically.
Let‛s take a look at this issue from the global point of view applying wider scope than some of our security analysts, though it may seem I am digressing from my subject.
The form of modern global world is shaped by a fight or maybe a battle for global predominance and supremacy going on in a moderately forcible or even bloody way, or bilaterally acceptable if not favourable cooperation among the most powerful countries. The concept is represented by a worldwide expansion in the field of trade, finance services, industry, technology, culture, religion, criminality etc. It is overwhelmingly a whole set of strategic steps in terms of foreign, economic and military policy which exploits geopolitics, mainly in the area of power engineering through strategic resources of oil and earth gas supplied by private oil giants like Chevron Texaco, Exxon Mobil, BP and Royal Dutch Shell (American, British). (Note: In 2006, Exxon showed net profit of $40 billion, but thank to shipwrecked oil tanker, it participates in sea and ocean pollution at the same time.) The focus is on the direct control or, at least, the influence over the world‛s entire main oil regions and earth gas fields. Nowadays, global capitalism and free market stand for the most efficient propulsion of economic progress and, simultaneously, they have been contributing to the fatal division into the rich and the poor as well as the degradation of environmental and mass culture.
The United States are the powerhouse of the creation of globalised system. Around 25 per cent out of the largest supranational corporations have their headquarters in the United States. The redemptive idea of an extraordinary democratic and civilising mission of the United States resulting in the origin of Pax Americana is the ideological basis for the claims of the US as a world power. This posture is closely linked with the increasing struggle of the US, the only hyperpower in the present, for an ultimate military predominance, primarily a nuclear one, the so-called whole-spectrum predominance.
The question arises, against whom this posture is aimed. Who is the daredevil acting as potential threat for US global ambitions? Just choose from among several options: Iran, North Korea, Syria, Israel, Libya, Somalia or is it anybody else? Multiple Independent Re-entry Vehicle (MIRV) Topol-M SS-27 (or upgraded Topol for Bulava-30 installed on nuclear submarines, or SS-25 SCRAMJET STEALTH) is exclusively in the arsenal of the Russian Federation‛s strategic missile forces.
We may look for the answer also in the US Secretary of Defence‛s appearance before the senatorial defence committee on February 7, 2007 during the approval of the budget for financial year 2008. There the American legislators learned that the United States face various threats not only from the side of Iran and North Korea, but they even have to be prepared to employ the whole spectrum of military capabilities, since they don‛t know, what will be the situation like in Russia, China or anywhere else. In another words, to gear up to use the potential of all armed forces against huge armies. General Peter Pace, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, added to the information provided by the Secretary the following, I quote: “You can look around the Earth. Begin with Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, Somalia, Sudan, Venezuela, Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, North Korea. And I‛m sure to have missed out somebody.”
It is apparent or at least an open secret that huge and powerful armies are commanded by the interests of coalitions consisting of giant oil companies and big noises in military industry. These companies exert their influence thank to the grip they hold on world‛s governmental policies.
Is it not only a historical fact, but also the reality of these days that the largest economic development and wealth was achieved by those countries which managed to use war preparations, not necessary a real war, as a means of acquiring wealth? It means that to prepare for a war outside one‛s own territory yet with the involvement of allies, some of them as service, is a very profitable business (also as regards military perspective) activity.
Sophisticated US state policy, closely linked with oil giants, attempted to get hold of pivotal share in Russian Yukos (from 25 per cent to 40 per cent). Even the metamorphosis of the Sibneft company (the second largest oil and gas owner in the world after ExxonMobil) into YukosSibneft was contrived by ExxonMobile and ChevronTexaco in relation to the then draft bill in Russian Duma, namely “the Act on Underground Resources”. Through these companies, Washington would be de facto capable of vetoing the construction of future Russian oil and earth gas pipelines as well as the suspension of oil contracts. This proposed intention would literally result in energetic upheaval. Vice-President Cheney had known it, President Bush had known it, but of importance was that also President Putin had known it.
It was yet sooner, in the early 90‛s, when the outgoing president Yeltzin granted generous mining privileges to American oil companies and other large western ones in connection with two huge oil projects. Sachalin I. for ExxonMobil and Sachalin II. for Royal Dutch Shell. Although in accordance with the PSA, Production Sharing Agreement, typical of relations between large Anglo-American oil companies and weak Third World countries, Russian government would be obliged to pay for oil and gas rights in the form of a part of its share in the future oil and gas production. Actually, it would be not until all project costs of these companies are covered that the first oil drip is allowed to flow into Russia.
If we accept US forecasts claiming that in next years, there will be an annual growth of 2 per cent as to worldwide oil demand, but the oil production will decrease by 3 per cent, daily need in the United States will increase by 50 million barrels in 2010. Nowadays, the world production (consumption) lies somewhere between 75 and 80 million barrels per day. In 2010, it will be between 120 and 130 million barrels according to the forecast. The oil production is likely to culminate around 2020. The question is, what we are supposed to do about it.
Let‛s not forget, that the Americans amounting to 4 per cent of the world‛s population are able to consume 25 per cent of the world‛s oil reserves, although they only can produce 40 per cent of their annual consumption out of their own sources. The remaining 60 per cent are imported.
At the same time, America consumes triple the amount of oil than any other nation, thus we cannot exclude that the future generations of young American patriots will lay down their lives, as actually present generations do, for oil or the dissemination of liberty and democracy; or possibly for a suitable, reasonable and excusable combination of both these American or worldwide aspects.
Here is the comparison of oil consumption to other countries: Japan consumes around 8 per cent of oil reserves, China 5 per cent, Germany and North Korea 4 per cent, Italy, France and Great Britain 3 per cent (data from 2000).
The general view in the United States is that “we must arm in order to secure oil and not food.”
The majority of oil is situated in Asian territory whereas two thirds of remaining oil reserves are confined in five countries of the Middle East (Saudi Arabia 26 per cent, Iraq 10 per cent, Kuwait 10 per cent, Iran 9 per cent and U.A.E. 9 per cent) with the lowest mining costs. Also several other countries have not negligible resources, among them are Bahrain, Brunei, Yemen, Qatar and Oman. Part of them is overtly hostile towards the United States. As for this matter, rather interestingly appears the White House‛s decision to conduct an independent military headquarters for Africa called Africom (the deposits of strategic raw materials in the Gulf of Guinea, particularly in Nigeria and Angola).
Since 2003, however, Russia has become the second largest oil producer in the world straight after Saudi Arabia and simultaneously it works with foreign capital which is in control of 26 per cent of overall oil mining.
The response is to find new oil deposits so that it won‛t come to a catastrophic deficiency resulting in devastating impact on global economic growth. And we don not talk here about negligible amounts, but about five oil regions equivalent to Saudi Arabia. Iraq is the second, or rather the third biggest country with oil reserves (deals in Euro in November 2000) and Iran (Euro is being discussed) has besides oil the second largest deposits of earth gas in the world. The OPEC countries are selling oil for dollars, but…
One has to point out that due to US military help to Iraq, all contracts between the former Iraqi Government and Russia, China and France has been annulled.
Does it mean that Iran and the Democratic People‛s Republic of Korea are the one and only strategic goal of the United States? If it is so, why is then Russia gradually more and more besieged by NATO countries, namely the former Warsaw Pact countries and even former USSR countries (Baltic countries)? There are even the so-called “easy” US bases placed in Romania and Bulgaria. Why did the colour revolutions, as it were (in Georgia, Ukraine) spread across Eurasia? Azerbaijan, Armenia and Turkmenistan are interested as well. If it is true, why is the US anti-missile system not installed in the Mediterranean for instance?!
In case of Iran it is unavoidable to talk about risks and potential threats, but definitely also about its pursuit of a secure position in the world. Throughout its history, Iran never waged a war of aggression. The war on Iraq lasting for eight years (1980-1988), was provoked by Iraq with the support of the USA that armed Iraq with weapons of mass destruction (chemical weapons) and allowed Israel to supply Iraq with weapons. In the present, Iran is an observer with the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (members of which are Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan). Among its aims are security cooperation, the solution of foreign disputes, the prevention of military conflicts, the fight against drug smuggling, the fight against militant Islamic extremism, separatism and terrorism. Iran is been applying of stable membership in it and the same holds true for Mongolia, India and Pakistan. Iran participated on the settling of situation and relations between India and Pakistan that waged war for three years and have nuclear weapons at their disposal. Iran is a member of the activated Non-Aligned Movement. Who is to blame? Probably the US Administrative that keeps on harassing with war and air raids instead of seeking to cooperate in the newly established room. Is it high time for a change not only in favour of overall security environment, but for the United States itself?
Since 2003 up to now, through the American strategy of the abolition of Iraqi army and Baas structures the war in Iraq has actually disposed Iran of traditional enemy and the trust of Americans in Shiitish clerics was a help to Iran allies inside Iraq. The US has thus strengthened exactly the state they intended to fight against.
It has serious consequences for the United States as well as for the whole Arab and Muslim world. Lay and leftist Arab nationalism, which shaped the ideological framework for the resistance against the Western supremacy, was in this way replaced by Islamic streams that locked this resistance within deeply conservative ideologies. Political conflicts in which national independence and development ways play the central role mingle with religious, cultural and community clashes. The current US debacle in Iraq opens a window of opportunity for Iran to carry the torch of Arabic nationalism under the standard of Islam.
For many people, Islamic republic makes the impression of a predecessor of a new battle front joining Arab nationalism and the groundswell of Islamic resistance. It has several aces up its sleeve, it can relieve or hamper the position of American armed forces, it can assist with the defeat of Israel in Lebanon thank to its allies in Hezbollah, it can even lend the Palestinians a helping hand by means of the support of Hamas. Its influence stretches up to oil fields in the Gulf and Saudi Arabia with Shiitish majority. Moreover, it has the possibility to fill the vast regional vacuum of power caused by the annihilation of Iraqi state, to affect the conflict between Israel and Palestine and even change the very character of the relations between the Shiites and the Sunnites.
The threats by the US and Israel, the military ones above all, just keep on increasing the strategic value of Iran and highlight its status as a predecessor of resistance in the Arab and Muslim world. Everything is underlined by the fact that the USA and Israel are floundering, on the one hand they are convinced of the necessity of a military operation, on the other hand they are aware of the fact that they must confine it to air raids and special missions. Such kind of the employment of armed forces, however, cannot overthrow the Iran regime, on the contrary. Is this the reason why the US President and Vice-President take into consideration the use of a nuclear weapon?
Has Iran learned no lesson from the war with Iraq, namely that countries that own nuclear weapons shouldn‛t be attacked and, at the same time, the even more dangerous thing, that if any country intends to wage war against the United States, it should better eschew it at least until it gains some nuclear weapons. That may be the reason why Iran has commenced the controversial part of its nuclear programme, which might be abused for military purposes. North Korea was faster and insured its regime by developing a nuclear weapon as well as missile launchers due to which, negotiations go on in much more quieter vein in comparison to Teheran. Have the Americans by means of the occupation of Iraq given rise to a situation in which several states seek to defend its independence and, of course, their interests as well through the ownership of a nuclear bomb? Nowadays, the majority of Arab countries are likely to find the achievement of the so-called nuclear sovereignty, bearer of which has to be a fundamental Muslim country, the only way how to get rid of the actual as well as symbolic asymmetry towards the post-colonial West. In addition, a nuclear weapon is no longer considered to be just a deterrent manner, but primarily a concentrated unit of strength and power, that encompasses all the basic prerequisites of central status within a modern civilisation.
Lots of countries have nuclear aspirations in the region of the Middle East and some of them have already put them into practice. Israel possesses nuclear weapons, in this way it struggles to cope with the Arab peril, but spurs arms race in this region simultaneously. Israel modified American cruise missiles Harpoon into nuclear weapon carriers and is able to launch them from German submarines class Dolphin.
Saudi Arabia has officially stated its intention to use the anti-missile shield for its own security.
We may conclude, that from the US policy of preventive attacks learn also other countries e.g. Israel. The question remains that if such methods won‛t cease and won‛t be punished and the UN will just proceed as it used to so far, namely with inefficient toothless negotiations and passing resolutions that the US subsequently vetoes, nothing will be solved. The world will again and again get trapped in vicious circle in which those ones with bigger nuclear muscles are right.
From the current perspective of military threat to the US and Russia from the side of North Korea and Iran, the former is more dangerous. It has carried out a series of tests with nuclear material and missile launchers, although the reports on results say that it still hasn‛t reached any crucial or usable effects. Nevertheless, these activities are to be monitored and set back in diplomatic and coercive manners or completely prevented from further progress. Some reports maintain that as early as 1998 it conducted a test with a medium-range missile.
In the present, the upgraded Taepodong 2 or 3 missile with the flying range of 4200 miles has been the subject-matter of discussions. Theoretically, it would be possible to hit the continental part of the US territory. In 2003, North Korea back out of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
There is information that North Korea helps Iran with the preparations for an underground nuclear explosion. North Korea and Iran signed a secret treaty based upon mutual exchange of information concerning nuclear technology, the types and composition of nuclear bombs etc.
In this sense a question arises, namely: Did the US along with Russia (but also France, Great Britain and China) sleep through the recent times, or how could they allow other countries to obtain nuclear independence?
How does the fulfilment of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) look like? In accordance with paragraph No. 4 of this treaty, the owners of nuclear bombs are obliged to take measures leading to nuclear disarmament. Not only do the countries of the so-called nuclear club welcome these activities, they even produce new types of bombs, step up their destructing power, accuracy and range. It looks kind of strange if one group of states claims something from the other one that is not willing to fulfil itself.
Are any of the geopolitical aspects from past centuries still valid?
In the next few lines I would like to deal with the historical background of the concept “geopolitics”. According to the British geographer Halford Mackinder, after World War I, it was inevitable for the maintenance of the hegemony of the British Empire to prevent the rapprochement between the nations of Eastern Europe i.e. Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria-Hungary and the Russian “heart” of Eurasian mainland (focal geographic point) by all means. After the Peace Talks of Versailles, he rendered the famous theorem:
Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland;
who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island;
who rules the World-Island controls the world.
The Heartland is the key area of Eurasia and the World-Island is the whole Eurasia including Europe, the Middle East and Asia. It is comprised of about ninety countries in all.
Almost everyone is likely to comprehend that the grip on the World-Island i.e. Europe, the Middle East and Asia is of the greatest moment. Consequently, those who want to rule over the whole world have to prevent potential integration of Eurasia into a coherent economic and military bloc, because if this happens, afterwards the only hyper power would get into trouble. After all, it is known that each of aspirants to world supremacy came from Eurasia. Eurasia comprises 75 per cent of population, 60 per cent of GDP and 75 per cent of earth‛s energetic resources. What is the power distribution within the Eurasian continent going to be like and what is going to happen to it is crucial for the global supremacy of the United States.
The importance of central Asia grows perpetually not only from the point of view of security, but also from economic and energetic perspective. This field is on many levels interlinked with the region of the Persian Gulf.
The countries in central Asia are involved in further set of organisations and programmes and their territories are places where the interests and influences of Russia, the USA, China, but Muslim countries as well encounter.
The analysts Lieber and Press affirm that in the present, it is the first time after nearly fifty years that the USA stand at the brink of nuclear supremacy. Most probably it will soon be possible to destroy Russian and Chinese long-range nuclear capacities by primary strike. If Washington doesn‛t change its policy or if Moscow and Beijing don‛t undertake further steps towards the increase of preparedness and armed forces, Russia and China along with the rest of the world will be left in the shade of US nuclear predominance for many years.
Maybe the first Chinese hidden agenda, that was later disclosed in fact, of the last days (January 11, 2007) is the annihilation of its older geostationary satellite at an altitude of 540 miles by an experimental missile with kinetic anti-satellite device (Note: This means that already early-warning satellites are destroyable and the war expands into space!?).
Let‛s get back to anti-missiles now. Why did not the Bush Cabinet on June 13, 2002 unilaterally back out of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM Treaty) of 1972 (as a part of SALT-I.) and did not replace it by a new, up-to-date treaty, maybe in broader sense?
The current ABM comprises three systems:
• USA Missile Defence,
• NATO Missile Defence and
• NATO Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence.
NATO ABM is supposed to solve the defence of the Alliance member states‛ territories against any kind of threat. The NATO Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence is to secure the protection of allied forces (committed troops) against ballistic missiles with the flying range of 1875 miles. This is a common project of NATO and Russia. The initial operational capability is scheduled to be achieved by 2010.
Having assessed the US Missile Defence we may come to such a conclusion that it is going to be developed in two directions (levels).
In terms of the first one, the establishment of ABM system on battlefield is in the pipeline. It is aimed at the protection of allied and US military groups and bases against the strikes of tactic missiles with the range of 440-500 miles.
The second and at the same time central direction is the establishment of national ABM on the territory of the United States and its close(st) allies. In this case, medium-range ballistic missiles and particularly intercontinental missiles will be the target.
The essence of the protection of the territory against the strike of missiles is the development of particular phases (levels) of target detection, target tracking and target intercepting systems. Starting missiles (1st and 2nd phase) are supposed to be destroyed by means of a flying laser device or pilot-free means. During the medium flight phase (3rd phase) missiles will be destroyed by using GBI anti-missiles (with the range of 3,125 miles) and in the final phase (4th phase) they will be destroyed by THAAD, MEADS, PAC-3 and SM-3 medium-range complexes (installed on ships).
The target surveillance, its detection and tracking along with giving orders for firing and airborne means is planned and carried out through diverse technical devices. In space through satellites, in air through aircrafts and on ground and sea by means of radar systems.
In the present, the means of destruction of US ABM encompass three stages (levels):
• ground level
• maritime level
• cosmic level
• (aerial level)
1. The first stage is the ground level composed of two anti-missile bases in Alaska and in California with early-warning radar system, installed outside the US territory (in Greenland and Great Britain).
2. The second stage is the maritime level composed of a group of cruisers and minelayers class AEGIS equipped with SM-3 missiles representing the mobile and extended troops of US ABM forces.
3. The third stage is the cosmic level composed of an early-warning satellite network. A supplement to the ground level in the form of a third anti-missile base in Europe (Poland and Czech Republic) is scheduled.
4. In addition to this an aerial level composed of a group of aircrafts equipped with YAL-1 lasers and pilot-free means is about to be established.
In some fields the tasks of the US national ABM are closely interrelated with battlefield tasks. In the Sea of Japan, if the extension is conducted, cruisers and minelayers class AEGIS with SM-3 missiles are able to complete ABM missions as if on battlefield protecting US bases in South Korea against medium-range missiles and thus intercepting intercontinental missiles during the start (on start trajectory). Anti-aircraft missile complexes THAAD that can be positioned on battlefield in the formation of US army troops can be employed also for the interception of single-unit warheads of intercontinental missiles. GBI anti-missiles, which are to be extended and developed in Europe, are intended to intercept intercontinental missiles present in given region, not in Great Britain and France, just in the Russian Federation.
The objectives regarding the defence of European territory against possible Iran attacks with the utilisation of medium-range missiles should by secured by means of anti-aircraft missile complexes MEADS, THAAD and upgraded Patriot PAC-3.
The established and gradually evolving system of US national ABM enables to solve a large scale of anti-missile tasks, but it is in itself not capable of protecting the US against mass nuclear strikes through intercontinental missiles with multiple self-guided warheads. Nowadays, only two countries are capable of such a strike, namely the United States and Russia.
So far the missile interception was for the United States feasible only from Asian side of Russia, but after finishing the third base in Europe (in Poland and Czech Republic), the missiles will be to intercept yet from the River Volga region and the Ural region.
The type of anti-missile defence developed by the US seem to be a supplement from strategic macroview, but it is an integral part of complex and whole-scale predominance with offensive character and the possibility of primary nuclear strike, not an autonomous shield. “Only those who have under the circumstances of possible retaliation a secure defence can afford an attack” – This is a logical deliberation typical of the past times.
This defence is not a part of NATO and EU anti-missile system, which as a matter of fact doesn‛t exist meanwhile (it was not until May 5, 2006 in Brussels that the final version of the NATO Missile Defence Feasibility Study was adopted, the basis for which was the joint project of Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence) and the US is not interested in it.
As far as the US would undertake a nuclear strike (primary and possibly secondary), in the target countries would remain only a minor residual nuclear arsenal. In such case even the meanwhile flawed and less efficient anti-missile defence system could prove itself to be more than sufficient as far as any retaliatory strike is concerned, since there would be solely few strategic commanding centres, radars, warheads and false targets left at the enemy‛s side. (Note: I just want to remind of the fact that the primary strikes have always been planed to hit commanding centres, radars, launch facilities etc. and recently satellites as well).
It is also important to point out that for several decades, China, Russia and other countries as well have proposed to adopt an international convention on the prohibition of war in space as well as preparations for it.
Every effective defence requires the annihilation of attacker‛s defence. China and Russia may respond to the establishment of the US anti-missile defence by asymmetric strategies, which will be of lower costs and enough effective at last. President Putin even said that Russia is in possession of strategic missiles that are able to break through the anti-missile defence and does not need to build its own anti-missile defence (that is the symmetric solution, as it were) also due to its enormous costs. Is it just a bluff? Every country that is exposed to the threat of primary strike and wants to prepare for it must preferentially target its weapons at bases of missile and anti-missile defence. This can be done not only by intercontinental missiles, but also by medium-range missiles (with the range up to 3,125-3,440 miles) or cruise missiles (around 1,875 miles) or their combination.
What is the essence of anti-missile system?
A functional and efficient ABM system necessitates three fundamental parts: the sensors, the system of arms and the system of command, leadership and communication.
• Sensors are intended for surveillance, detection, interception and automatic tracking of ballistic missile from ground (stationary and mobile), sea (on ships and afloat platforms), air (aircrafts) and space (satellites), the processing of estimated ballistic trajectory parameters, the identification of the type of missile even in an array of false targets and the steering of homing arms systems.
• Arms systems for the annihilation of missiles secure the surveillance, identification and annihilation of targets by the utilisation of kinetic energy technology (EKV, LEAP) or concentrated energy (high-performance laser).
• The system of command, leadership and communication provides the commanders with data on unknown ballistic missile and automatic surveillance of sensors focused on the most effective direct steering and homing of arms systems. It coordinates the destruction of missile and the cooperation with the bodies of national command during the assessment of loss in life, effectiveness and time remaining till the impact of missile. A vast network of the IFICS In-Flight Interceptor Communications system connected with anti-missiles is at disposal.
Several types of radars were included into the BMDS anti-missile system so far. The GBR-P tracking radar prototype with the range of 3,125 miles mounted on the Kwajalein atoll in Southern Pacific was used during launch tests in 1998.
UHF early-warning radars (enhanced AN/FPS-115 PAVE PAWS) on the military air base in Beale (California) cooperating with enhanced BMEWS radars in Fylingdales and Menwith Hill (Great Britain), Thule (Greenland) and Clear Air Station in Alaska. Enhanced were also Cobra Dane radars on Eareckson Air Base on the Shemya Island (Aleutian Islands) and SBX radar on Vandeberg Air Base in California.
Also a naval version of SBX installed on an afloat platform and installed in Adak in Alaska has been constructed.
Tactic range data of radars installed in Thule, Great Britain and in Alaska are sufficient for the coverage of the majority of Russian territory, the half of Iran and they even stretch out to the Indian and Chinese border. Therefore the coverage of the territory of the Czech Republic proves less reasonable unless only data specifications are the matter of concern…
Let‛s do not forget about such “details” like the pulse performance of radars and the inevitable energy source for its operation. The pulse performance may amount from 40 to 1,000 MW or more and the energy source around 1-5 MW. Will an independent underground nuclear reactor or mobile container nuclear power plant like that in Greenland be necessary? And how about the impact on people‛s health, nature and other electric appliances for instance in national meteorological facilities, mobile networks and so on. Radiation protection zone for aircrafts and thus flight-free zone for civil aviation may stretch across a ring with 6¼ – 31¼ mile radius. Within the distance of around three miles is an area with the possibility to jam TV signal and beyond 10¼ miles also radio signal.
Lastly, we are kind of experienced also in Slovakia when the Government, several years ago, had to put out of operation certain types of radars that jammed TV broadcast and signal of our neighbours etc. In my opinion, the set up of radars and anti-missiles in Greenland, Alaska, Siberia and on atolls is not a perfect defence, but in small and medium-sized countries of Europe it even represents a potential threat for wide surroundings. Who knows what the reaction of Austria will be like!?
Neither the Russian radar DARJAL on Gabalinskaja base situated on southern slopes of western Caucasus, which was put into operation in 1998, is anything different. It is older than XBR, but has a range of approximately 3,750 miles and its performance is 40 MW. It monitors Iran, Turkey, China, Pakistan, India, Iraq and several African countries and islands in the Indian Ocean as well. Its presence affects the environment, but this is denied by the Russian side.
Russia, however, has nowadays the so-called black holes in the system of radiolocation detection of missile launches as far as the territory of the Pacific Ocean and a part of the Atlantic Ocean is concerned (the disposal of a radar in Latvia, problems with two radars in Ukraine and Azerbaijan and outdated Dnepr radars) and that‛s why it‛s been already carrying out tests of a new type of radars VORONEZDM below St. Petersburg and intends to position them so that they head all necessary directions. I‛m convinced that in the not-too-distant future, Russia will in terms of the early-warning anti-missile system to a large extent territorially re-build its strategic radiolocation by gathering financial as well as technological means.
If the US and Russia joined their “radar capacities” they would be able to furnish also the EU, NATO, Asia and other parts of the world with a radar service and thus meet possible future threats emerging from the Middle East region and without the escalation of current conflicts.
We shouldn‛t forget about the Defence Support Programme (DSP) satellites of which operate since 1970 on geo-synchronic orbits (22,414 miles) and provide early-warning on the launch of intercontinental missiles through infrared sensors. This system has been probably overshadowed by the latest development of new types of missiles. It is going to be gradually substituted by the SBIRS (Space-Based Infrared System) satellite system with two main cosmic parts. SBIRS High with four satellites on geostationary orbit and other two on high elliptic orbits. SBIRS Low with around twenty or thirty satellites on low crossing orbits to secure exact tracking of the launched offensive warheads in the medium phase of flight. It is at the same time capable of a very precise steering of tracking homing radars and thus cutting down the radars‛ radiation time connected with the chances of their annihilation by anti-radio-electric guided missiles getting slimmer. Such a lay-out enables the global coverage of earth‛s surface and early warning against the launch of ballistic as well as tactic missiles within seconds. In 2001, the SBIRS Low system was renamed the STSS (Space Tracking an Surveillance System). These early-warning satellites enable to locate the position of launching facility and measure the instantaneous velocity, the acceleration of the starting missile the number of warheads (as well as to identify their version), false targets and fragments after the strike if necessary and with excellent accuracy.
The cosmic infrared alert system SBIRS is supposed to add a completely new dimension to the US anti-missile defence. The sensors within the ground part of the GMD system (radars) know their physical limits which are connected predominantly with the curvature of the earth‛s surface. The worldwide coverage of earth‛s surface by the SBIRS system will enable the annihilation of missiles far away from the US borders, on distant locations. In practice it means that the risks of all negative impacts in case of the explosion of nuclear, chemical and biological warheads will be kept to a minimum for the US. Therefore the putting of this system into operation, scheduled for 2008, will stand for the most crucial qualitative breakthrough in terms of the whole US anti-missile defence programme.
At the same time it will trigger next attempts to eliminate the effect of these early-warning satellites (SBIRS) in space. The vicious circle of armament and possible destruction on a hi-tech level is likely to continue also in space.
As regards the ICBM strategic missile launchers the US has 550 pieces of which, I have to remind that apart from intercontinental ballistic missiles (ten sub-warheads maximum), LGM-118A peacekeeper can have up to eleven self-homing Mark 21 missiles, each of them carrying 300 kilo ton nuclear warhead launched from ground, there are also other feasible alternatives.
In terms of the so-called Strategic Triad, there are nuclear submarines (14 pieces) each carrying 336 warheads in missiles with multiple warheads (up to 24 pieces per one missile) and strategic bombers (115 pieces) whereas the US possess the most of nuclear device strategic carriers, expressed in numbers – up to 1001 pieces with 5521 pieces of nuclear stock and approximately the same amount is in the reserves with removed tritium. Russia is in possession of 812 pieces (542 ICBM of which 291 are mobile, 192 are carried by 12 submarines and 78 bombers) with 5682 nuclear stock and other 10,100 in the reserves or disposal (the United States and Russia signed in 2002 the SORT committing themselves to cut down the number of warheads to 1,700-2,200 pieces on either side by 2012).
The intercontinental missile Peacekeeper utilises the same silos as the modified Minuteman II anti-missiles with Raytheon EKV warhead which is in state of preparations. Not only carry the missiles EKV (hit to kill exoatmospheric kill vehicle) infrared homing warheads, but also high-explosive blast fragmentation rocket and range-restricted nuclear warhead. What will they be verified like, what means are underground forces on the US anti-missile bases located in European territory in possession of?
If the “rogue” states really existed, or if they were a clear and present danger for the world, it would be logical, correct and more effective of the US to make its anti-missile defence programme an international affair. Besides its own territory, it would offer it also to Europe including Russia and other powers as well in particular China, India, Turkey, South Korea. Moreover, political and scientific cooperation among these power centres could be a part of the content of this project.
The flight trajectory of an intercontinental missile can be divided into four stages.
• The first stage is active. It takes from 3 to 5 minutes since the moment of start till the switch-off of the last degree engines and their disconnection from warheads at the altitude of 660,000-990,000 feet. At this altitude, following parts remain connected: warheads, autopilot, manoeuvring engines and the set of devices for the break through ABM (heavy and light imitators and hundred thousands of dipolar deflectors for the jamming of radiolocation means of the adversary).
• During the second stage, in accordance with the command of steering system, a manoeuvre to reach the first calculated point is undertaken. Here the warhead aimed at target No. 1 and a certain number of the devices for the break through the adversary‛s ABM are launched. Then a manoeuvre to hit the second calculated point i.e. target No. 2 follows. In this way it continues in respect to the amount of warheads. From 30 to 40 seconds are counted for each manoeuvre. Within the anti-missile defence, the best thing would be to destroy the missile during the first stage (or possibly the second one), when the missile rapidly accelerates (3 minutes if solid engine fuel is used and 5 minutes if liquid engine fuel is used) after the start. Neither the US, however, has adequate arm systems to perform it successfully, they are still in the process development (i.e. YAL-1 aircraft laser).
• In the third stage taking from 10 to 20 minutes, it is a free flight of all launched elements (offensive as well as false ones) in ballistic lane at an altitude from 3,300,000 to 4,950,000 feet. That‛s why the GMD system (Ground-based mid-course Defence, a part of defensive ground means for the medium stage of the flight), anti-missile (a part of the anti-missile BMDS Ballistic Missile Defence System) is supposed to destroy the warhead during the third stage in the medium stage of flight, as it were, which means in high altitude i.e. over the atmosphere in vacuum. The most suitable spot for the collision of EKV (Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle) device, carried by the anti-missile with warhead, is in the flight phase between the top and an altitude of 429,000 feet (thermosphere). Warhead is still remote from the target and moves usually passively apart from the most sophisticated active manoeuvring types like Russian Topol-M (SS-27) for example.
• In the fourth stage, the final and shortest one, lasting for one minute approximately, a cloud of elements enters the atmosphere at an altitude around 363,000-396,000 feet at a speed of about 4.4 miles per second. Under the aerodynamic drag, light elements will lag behind the heavier ones and also the warhead. In this stage, it is as good as impossible so far to distinguish warheads flying in the cloud of false targets. Therefore it is momentous for ABM to destroy intercontinental missiles in the first stage of the flight (after the start). The velocity of the anti-missile must be higher than the velocity of the adversary‛s attacking intercontinental missile. The distance between the anti-missile and the ballistic lane of a liquid propulsion missile mustn‛t exceed 312 miles. In case of solid fuel missile, the boundary lies at 187 miles. As the US itself confess, nowadays, it is inconceivable to secure the interception of missiles hidden inside Russian territories and this is exactly the impulse behind the intention to approach (extend) the position of anti-missiles towards the frontiers of the Russian Federation.
All GBI (Ground Based Interceptor) anti-missiles will be positioned on two bases in underground ferroconcrete silos in Fort Greely in Alaska (40 pieces) and on Vandeberg military air base in California (20 pieces). Now, a third, the European base in Poland (10 pieces of anti-missiles) and the Czech Republic (radar) is negotiated. According to the final configuration for the years 2011-2020, 125 anti-missiles are in the pipeline for Alaska and the same amount is scheduled for North Dakota.
This is meanwhile the extension of anti-missile base planned by the United States. It emerges from a relatively short time span, the so-called time and space frame in which the adversary‛s warhead must be intercepted. In this frame, the warhead must be detected and located, a headquarters‛ decision on its destruction must be issued, anti-missiles and homing systems activated, commands given and anti-missiles launched. In addition to all this, the anti-missile, or rather EKV, time of approach to the warhead must be calculated and the Miniature Kill Vehicle (MKV) is to be launched beyond the atmosphere as near as possible to the target. MKV must be homed to the target in order to destroy it afterwards through its kinetic energy. Everything must be managed within several minutes. This is the reason why every mile, that the base is positioned nearer to the estimated missile lane, is valuable. The fact remains that at present, the construction of military bases is the vestige of the Cold War which already came to an end. A question arises, namely who is all this good for?
The US has invested into the anti-missile defence approximately $91 billion so far. For next six years, next $58 billion is scheduled.
The general assumption is the US argues that the layout of anti-missiles in Poland and radar in the Czech Republic will secure their defence. Unfortunately, it is a mistake. If a intercontinental ballistic missile was aimed at Poland, this ballistic missile would have to enter the descent stage (lasting about 3 or 5 minutes) already at distant entries (625 miles away from the target). After the entry into the upper layers of the atmosphere, anti-missiles turn unusable and in such a case incapable of protecting anybody. Technically, it is impossible. The anti-missile wouldn‛t manage or be able to launch EKV, which, in case that it somehow resists to burn, wouldn‛t be functional (manoeuvring engines would be inefficient and sensors blinded).
In order to secure defence, other systems (e.g. Patriot PAC-3, MEADS or THAAD) for the final stage of the flight of ballistic missiles would have to be developed to assist. These are effective as far as the destruction of short- and medium-range missiles is concerned, against intercontinental missiles in the upper layers of the atmosphere, however, totally inefficient not to speak of the SS-25 SRAMJET STEALTH missile.
The results of the tests conducted are only accepted with mixed feelings and even mistrust. For example the Scientists‛ Letter on Missile Defence of April 4, 2005 hints at the experimental shooting tests conditions being intentionally adjusted so that they come off best. This statement is justified by facts that the shooting was performed at minimum distances of only 438 miles and at minimum altitudes of 147 miles. In real situations, the distances as well as altitudes would be significantly greater. The training target had been warmed up before the launch so that the thermal contrast was higher and easier to detect for the EKV infrared sensor. There were GPS receivers along with radio transponders installed on the training targets. These emitted data on their position, served as radar beacon and were used for the homing of anti-missiles. Anti-missiles for test purposes fly at maximum speed of 1.375 miles per second whereas the desired maximum speed of operational missiles amounts to more than five miles per second. The increased velocity of the anti-missile will cut down the time (to a half approximately) in which the EKV sensor has to identify the genuine and the false warhead. The greatest hazard to the integrated electronic components and sensors is the massive overload in the time span during which the missile reaches maximum speed. One must also be aware of the fact that even the simplest alien missiles will carry not only genuine warheads, but also diverse supplemental devices in order to deceive, computer-guided sensors put in the centre of EKV. This condition causes huge problems escalating in the inability to distinguish real warheads from the false ones.
The propensity for technical problems is exemplified by the incident of the summer 2006 on Fort Greely base (Alaska), when 7 out of 25 underground shelters including the command and steering centres of anti-missile system were disabled in the aftermath of heavy rains that flood them. Their reconstruction will take one year.
Experts estimate that the probability of a strike in a real situation is somewhere between 5 and 10 percent! From 10 to 20 anti-missiles (EKV) are necessary for the destruction of a single intercontinental missile, or rather warhead (one carrier can take from 6 to 14 sub-warheads).
Irrespective of the ABM success rate, even General Obering has confirmed that after an anti-missile hits an alien warhead (sub-warhead) through EKV, the remains (fragments) aren‛t likely just to “vaporise”, but they fall on earth. Nevertheless, their size shouldn‛t exceed eight inches.
The missiles are supposed to encounter over the Earth‛s atmosphere. The velocity of each of the objects (anti-missile and warhead) is around 4.375 miles per second (more than 15,625 mph). The fragments resulting from such a massive collision keep on flying (falling) at as speed an in a direction dependent upon the angle the objects hit each other. According to assumptions, the flight length can measure from 1,250 miles to 3,125 miles. If the warhead heat shield is disrupted in the aftermath of the collision, constituent components burn in the atmosphere and around 10 per cent of them falls on the Earth in form of small meteorites.
The simulation of the scattering of these around 10 per cent of fragments is similar to the American space shuttle which disintegrated and burnt in the atmosphere due to a damaged coat several years ago. Its remains, the dimension of which exceeded eight inches, didn‛t vaporised as well, but were scattered across a vast area of the US territory.
During the contact collision of the anti-missile and warhead, a problem is the nuclear fuse, which is radioactive and sure to contaminate the surroundings. I speak of hundreds of miles of areas on the Earth. As a rule, plutonium and enriched uranium are in question. The uranium is very pyrophoric, even if burnt during the collision it disperses into the atmosphere and its toxicity is considered by many experts even more hazardous than its radioactive effects.
Is a nuclear explosion possible when an anti-missile collides with a nuclear warhead? Real tests and experiments aren‛t feasible in laboratories so there are only estimates and surmises left. American specialists do not rule out a nuclear explosion, on the contrary, the Czech ones say it is out of question.
The reason for discrepancy is the fact that a classical initiation system, utilised to induce a fission reaction, is during the collision destroyed yet before it starts to work. Warheads have a rather complicated multiple system for the prevention of initiation. This, however, does not exclude the possibility of the installation of proximity fuses of any working principles in such a system. These put the initiation system into operation in case the EKV anti-missile device approaches the warhead. The nuclear warhead can explode even without any contact collision.
However, it shouldn‛t do any severe harm straight after the blow. There cannot be such a devastating shock wave in vacuum. The dispersed radioactive material would gradually drop into the atmosphere in which it would be diluted and lastly it would scatter across a vast area on the earth. Experts in the kinetic energy missile destruction technology also known as “hit to kill” which means the non-nuclear EKV destruction device, dispute over its effectiveness. Some of them maintain that its effectiveness amounts to 0.1 (10 per cent). The fact remains that the effectiveness can be modified by an explosive and a splinter effect, but its effect on warheads protected by a heat shield is negligible. Logically follows that the next and effective solution is a nuclear warhead on the anti-missile. The former US Secretary of Defence Rumsfeld commissioned a preliminary scientific report on the integration of nuclear interceptors (anti-missiles) into the anti-missile defence system.
Regardless of laboratory or reality-close test results, the focal question is whether the potential reality consists in something fully different. Why should the citizens of the Slovak Republic or any other European country become the hostages of a situation in which the final decision, leading to a provocation of a conflict, will make somebody completely different from us and the devastating consequences in any form will strike our territory and lives?
I myself think that this condition will be gradually solved to the satisfaction of all in the not-too-distant future and the ABM system will be more effective than in the present (by using a nuclear warhead on the anti-missile if necessary). It will obviously enormously increase the expenditure than originally scheduled. It is clear that all this will result in the loss of strategic nuclear balance and dissuasion. It will also trigger the continuation of a highly sophisticated technical as well as technological armament in terms of the development and production of missile and anti-missile technology and its deployment into space. The key players in this game are the US on one level and Russia along with China on another level.
Since 2000, the Slovak Republic could have had its adequate anti-missile defence or shield. Not in such a megalomaniacal or global dimensions of course. The only task to fulfil was the acquisition of the S-300PMUI (Favorit) system or the A-400 (Triumf) system with relevant 3D radar. Besides the S-300 system, already established with the army, we could have covered apart from our territory also the territory of our neighbours to a large extent and at the same time join the common NATO ABM particularly to strike against medium- and long-range missiles, but strategic missiles were discussed as well. And maybe the S-500 system will come as well!?
The then Slovak Government, however, preferred to settle a fine for the dishonouring of a contract, namely $54 million (more than SK2.5 billion). We may assume that it joined anti-missile defence as earl, as that time! Poland is been weighing up that if it agrees on the deployment of anti-missiles, in addition it will demand from the US side the deployment of a few batteries of the Patriot PAC-3 mobile anti-aircraft system as a protection against possible Russian and Belorussian reprisal. Are we under the threat of tension escalation?
“No racket is peace-keeping”, this was declared in sense of goodwill by the Charter 77 in its peace-keeping mission. Neither this statement was absolutely true. In terms of cosmic research with the assistance of two rivals, the US and Russia, useful research along with worldwide communication is been conducted. American rockets use Russian motors. International Space Station (ISS) is produced by Russia and is visited by international crews an also private well-off self-payers.
All cosmic rockets developed originally from intercontinental missiles. In 2006, 65 rockets were launched into space 24 of which Russian and 18 American. Russia has in 98 satellites in operational use and is been renewing its global navigation system (GLONASS) as well. The interconnection of the American and Russian system is now the subject-matter of discussions. Russia cooperates with the European Space Agency as to compatibility with the Galileo satellite system, the modernisation of Soyuz and Progres and for 2012 they have been jointly preparing a new transport rocket Klipper. As far as the research of the moon, the US work independently whereas Russia and China have been developing own research technology.
In December 2006, the Russian carrier Cosmos 3M put the German satellite SAR-Lupe into orbit, which is deemed a spy one in jargon. According to the contract between Rosoboronexport an the German COSMOS International Satellitenstart GmbH, the Russian side is obliged to carry other five of these satellites into space. This type of German satellite is supposed to meet the requirements of the NATO command in Europe. The satellites‛ technical equipment allows also the French to use it. They will provide the German side with access to the optical HELIOS II as a quid pro quo.
Thus it is a fact, namely when speaking of missiles, we would find more common points and liaison in favour of cooperation, peace and stabilisation rather than the search for an enemy and the arousing of mistrust. The larger the cooperation rate and the better the understanding in the field of missiles as a common point of interest is, the lower is the risk of armament abuse.
The function of missiles is primary for military purposes and therefore they can stand for the point of mistrust and threat. We must thoroughly consider which tendency is closer to reality and thus to the hope for a civilised and peaceful future.
What will it continue like?
What will elicit, or rather is already now been eliciting reactions to this condition, or at least the pretext for war hawks in the West and East for future investments in arms systems based on the construction and completion of the US anti-missile shield in a part of Europe, the militarization of the whole Middle East and the besieging of Russia and China by an interconnected network of new US military bases?
The deployment of the US global anti-missile system in Europe, maybe Caucasus, Japan and Great Britain (meanwhile!) has lead to a wide assessment of possible solutions and variants of the Russian reaction.
The pivotal condition of a successful effectiveness of the US ABM is a preventive strike allowing to destroy the majority of adversary‛s missile and nuclear capacity till its utilisation (launch).
Direct increase in the number of launch facilities and their warheads offers no solution for the break through ABM. The time limitation of pre-launch preparations for intercontinental missiles might be a solution to a certain degree. Human factor represents a bit of risk however. Another solution could be to keep the mobile missile complexes type TOPOL and TOPOL-M in permanent alert (which are less vulnerable than launch facility in underground forces) and in combination with ballistic missile submarines in alert in polar regions. These measures decrease the possibility to annihilate the entire or the majority of adversary‛s nuclear capacity even in case of surprise preventive strike.
Russia plans to make up a National Air and Cosmic Defence System of Russia (ACD) based upon the up-to-date A-135 anti-missile defence system of Moscow. This system contains two types of anti-missiles. The first one is 51T6 (Gorgon) with the altitude range from fifty to 62 miles and length range of 375 miles. The second one is 53T6 (Gazelle) with the altitude range of 31 miles and length range of 220 miles.
Apart from interception and annihilation of ballistic missiles the National Air and Cosmic Defence System of Russia (ACD) will protect the federation‛s territory against the strikes of fighter jets and cruise missiles. Moreover it will intercept and destroy cosmic means playing central role in US ABM. This system is supposed to integrate five systems: anti-aircraft and air defence system, ABM system, anti-missile early-warning system, space control system and REB system. The realisation is due to finish between 2015 and 2020.
By completing the US ABM and the Russian ACD a condition will come about in which the previous world‛s stability, granted by the military game of two former adversaries and simultaneously super powers, will be irretrievably lost.
The growth of the nuclear capacities of China, India, Pakistan, Israel, North Korea, possible nuclear bomb construction by Iran and other countries in the context of technical development, enabling the construction of the so-called foul nuclear bombs, makes up the alternative to promote bombs to such a level in which they become weapons rife with regional wars. In this way, human inventiveness in terms of self-destruction is highlighted applying actually to the whole civilisation itself.
And this is a challenge for hyperpowers, the United States and Russia, to pursue through joint effort the mutual and for the whole world so vital way out of this potentially hazardous oncoming situation!
Russia has issued a preliminary posture that it considers an unilateral withdrawal of the Intermediate Range-Nuclear Forces Treaty from 1987. The real range of these missiles is from 312 to 3,125 miles. The reasons given include unilateral withdrawal of the US in 2002 of the Treaty on ABM from 1972, but also the future prospects of some countries on the Eurasian continent which in the course of the next twenty or thirty years will be capable of the construction of tactical missiles, or they will be in possession of missiles of foreign production and Russia will be in their striking distance. Russian medium-range missiles (RSD-10 Pionier SS-20) cannot reach US territory unless deployed on the Chukchi peninsula and they won‛t be deployed there according to the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation.
Further step may be Russia‛s withdrawal out of the Treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe from Ural to west.
Nowadays in Russia, there is the beginning of preparations for technical measures that would reduce the possibility of start detection as well as the length and duration of missile flight in the first stage. It is feasible by means of the substitution of liquid fuel for missile engines for solid one. It would result in flight time compression to one minute (in comparison to 3-5 minutes) and flight altitude reduction under 50-62.5 miles (in comparison to 125-187.5 miles). Next step is to make the interception of a missile by an anti-missile as difficult as possible through performing missile manoeuvres in vertical as well as horizontal level. The modernised Topol-M (SS-27) missile pulled it off during flight tests.
Will this condition spark also with other economically strong countries of the world, primarily in Asia and the Middle East (e.g. China, South Korea, India, Pakistan, North Korea, Israel, the last four ones rank among unofficial nuclear powers), another militarization aimed at manoeuvring intercontinental missiles, integrated stealth technology (invisible), false warhead technology and similar anti-missile system as a kind of their own national anti-missile defence? Some states despite having the potential for the construction of nuclear weapons, e.g. Japan, Sweden, Germany waived the production (meanwhile?). China proposes to respond to the US anti-missile system by quadrupling the number of intercontinental missiles and thus overload it simply.
With absolute certainty can be said that there is no reliable defence system able to resist intercontinental missiles in the world so far. This holds true also for the US anti-missile system. The GBI system is incapable of protecting the United States against Multiple Independent Re-entry Vehicle (Topol-M SS-27 or SS-25) which are in the arsenal of Russian strategic missile forces. The American system neither designed nor constructed for this purpose. In the present, those states with nuclear and missile weapons in their armoury developed a set of methods how to weather this system asymmetrically and at a relatively low cost.
Also the “Son of Star Wars” was supposed to destroy ballistic missiles through the HAARP (High-frequency Active Auroral Research Program) transmitters by means of a high-speed particle layer (high-energetic radiation cloud) in magnetosphere far over atmosphere. HAARP could function as an electromagnetic impulse emitter, which would “fry” thank to its performance any kind of satellites, weapons or communication means. It could at the same time affect weather and air circulation, i.e. court a storm, tornado, extreme heat or frost, but also artificial lightning markedly stronger than natural lightning and with high probability also trigger an earthquake. It would become a geophysical weapon. In 1976, more than sixty countries signed the Geophysical Weapons Ban Treaty. The question remains, whether the Geophysical Weapons Ban Treaty will be abolished if the anti-missile defence is surmounted. As regards this matter Russia, for instance, secretly tested the SS-25 ICBM prototype in 2001. Till this missile abandons the atmosphere, it turns back towards the earth‛s surface and flies as a homing missile, jet plane or bomber at an altitude of around 25 miles at the velocity of Mach 5 (3,750 mph). It is covered by the stealth technology is to intercept neither by HAARP transmitter (working in space) nor by GMD (anti-missiles), nor even by the PATRIOT PAC-3 system.
Based on the information available, there are serious doubts about fundamental preconditions for the US project being all right in regard with real threats, which the project is supposed to protect the United States and other countries against, and also technological solutions connected with its effectiveness.
None of the so-called “troublemaker” countries is in possession of missile weapons that would seriously jeopardise Europe, not to speak of the US, with the range of approximately 3,125 to 5,000 miles, and they are not likely to obtain them in the foreseeable future. Later on, however, they will probably have them. Is the extension of US ABM on European site a good solution?
We only may assume that the current stage of the global deployment of the US ABM system is just the beginning. General Obering, the Chairman of the US Agency, stated that the United States is considering a deployment of further anti-missile radar (mobile one?) on Caucasus. This confirms the fact that as soon as the first generation is deployed, there will be other ones to deploy again and again. If the potential adversary or adversaries improve their weapons, another ABM system upgrade will be needed. There will always be a reason for modernisation and investment into the system. If the system is to be functional and efficient, the financing will know no limits. It is going to be a black hole where besides vast amounts money also the trust between states is likely to vanish.
From 2008, four FPS-XX radars together with US mobile (naval) AEGIS systems with radars and SM-3 missiles will stand on the Japanese site. Nowadays, Japan has thirty PAC-3 (Patriot Advanced Capability – 3) anti-aircraft missile complexes on standby and it plans to extend it on ten military bases as a protection against North Korean missiles.
Can the stress on the US “whole-spectrum predominance” guide the world into a nuclear hell in the aftermath of erroneous beliefs and mistakes? Is it worse than in the period of bipolar world, where the nuclear game, a kind of war that couldn‛t be won, and the contemporary reality emerging from it were the cornerstone of stability and they also limited and managed to limit the war within the boundaries agreed on?
The possession of an effective anti-missile system is been shifting the stabilisation role of nuclear weapons into a qualitatively another level. The utilisation of nuclear weapons is conceivable only when the attacker (or defender) possesses an enough efficient “defence” system for the destruction of adversary‛s intercontinental missiles with nuclear warheads. Thus it is a unique system enabling the possible utilisation of nuclear weapons with expected success of the attacker. The one who manages to conduct this anti-missile system becomes a potential and monopolistic nuclear attacker of a higher calibre! One has to underscore that an effective victory in a nuclear war can be achieved in such a way in which the possible victor transposes or extends the battlefield of such a war (nuclear one) to a distant place from its territory and maintains it there! The question remains if the European politicians are likely to accept it?
The quotation of Condoleezza Rice, the US Secretary of State, does not need any comment in this context. According to her: “Anybody who is initiated into this matter cannot affirm that any ten missile interceptors (Note: with ten to forty sub-warheads) installed in Poland may jeopardise the deterrent power of thousands of Russian (nuclear) devices.”
The XBR radar version, focused on the assessment of ballistic missiles in the medium stage of flight in the EMR (European Midcourse Radar) zone is to be an extraordinary one with maximum range of 4,190 miles an for classical warheads 2,500 miles. It should theoretically be capable of the monitoring of an extensive area from north to south and it also has an outstanding resolution capacity of six inches. That‛s what disconcerts everything and everyone aimed at lastly.
In the end of 2004, not only Moscow became aware in the context of the facts above that a new form of a Cold War has broken out, namely in the field of strategic control, the predominance over energetic resources and a unilateral nuclear supremacy. The United States has pursued it since ages, or rather since its own resources of oil and gas went slimmed down and the split of the USSR. Is it an accident or contingence that Russia, as single Eurasian country, is able to arrange affective alliances by means of its huge oil and gas resources? In the context of the unique value of US anti-missile system where nuclear carriers and ammunition play the central part, that may be the answer to the seemingly less important and separated matter or issue of anti-missile defence extended to two European countries. And again the same question, namely if the European politicians are likely to accept it.
In the new National Security Strategy of the United States of America from 2006 we may observe a tendency for the prevalence of power elements and the reliance on overwhelmingly own forces. To put in a short characteristics, in the foreground are the power and transformation diplomacy. Flagrant is also the orientation and continuation towards the colour revolutions, as it were, even though the got themselves into trouble in the present. It contains also a caution to the Kremlin that “the effort to prevent domestic as well as foreign democratic development will be an impediment to the development of the relation between Russia on the one hand and the United States, Europe and other neighbours on the other hand. The secure, trustworthy and reliable nuclear powers of the United States are still playing a decisive role even in the new strategic environment”. Transformation diplomacy should rest upon the growing military potential of the United States.
How shell we perceive the draft budget for the financial year 2008, submitted by President Bush who asserts that it reflect US priorities among which are the protection of homeland against terrorism, the retention of a strong economy with low taxes, at the same time, the Pentagon is scheduled to receive out of the almost 3-trillion budget $716 billion which stands for nearly 25 per cent, whereas in 2007, the sum amounted to 449 billion. Shall we construe it as giving priority to the continuation and solution of international issues through military tools?
President Putin told before the parliament that the fighting ability of Russian strategic nuclear forces will be stepped up thy supplies of:
• Strategic long-range aircrafts
• Launching facilities for strategic missile armed forces
New types of weapons will enable Russia to maintain the world‛s strategic balance.
Why is cooperation turning into rivalry again?
After the split of a bipolar world a tendency to overall mutual cooperation and trust arose. The primary reaction of new regimes was as good as natural. I only want to point out the recommendation by the former President Havel of Czechoslovakia regarding the dissolution of military pacts and his first speech in the US Senate containing the memorable statement “If you want to help us, help preferentially the Soviet Union”. The standing ovation sparked by this sentence was a characteristic feature of the then political atmosphere. We cannot forget about the massive disarmament (The Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, SALT I, SALT II, Open Sky etc.) and the search for real ways of cooperation, which was steadily appearing indeed between former rivals, the United States and Russia. The United Nations was gradually obtaining significance and so was doing OSCE, both with the struggle for completing their missions. The reality begun to deteriorate step by step. The new topic of a “security vacuum” and perpetual search for a new enemy was placed high on the agenda. The US pursued the position of a unilateral power and thus changed its attitude to NATO.
In the end I must mention the Declaration of State and Government Representatives of NATO member states and Russian Federation adopted at summit in Rome on May 28, 2002 and the inception of the NATO-Russian Council (replaced the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council from 1997) In the foreword stands: “At the beginning of the 21st century, we live in a new closely interdependent world in which the new unprecedented threats call for new joint action. Therefore we, the new member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and Russian federation, commence a new era in terms of our relations focused on the increase of our capability of working jointly in the fields of common interest and facing collectively the threats and risks to our security.” Besides other fields in terms of this cooperation, the field of missile-defence is mentioned as well.
The Declaration mentioned was preceded by the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between the Russian Federation and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation from May 27, 1997 signed in Paris. Among the basic principles is the statement that the Euro-Atlantic society is indivisible and NATO along with Russia work jointly in the interests of Europe-wide security and the protection of common values. They acknowledge that OSCE plays the central role in the keeping of peace and stability within Europe. Europe is a common territory of security and stability without dividing lines or interest fields that would curb the sovereignty of any state. One of the provisions of this Act declares that there is no interest, plan or any reason to deploy nuclear weapons in the territories of new NATO member states. The conclusion is that none of the parties finds the other one a threat nor will they try to disadvantage it in terms of security in the future.
And it is exactly the threat of the existence of destructive arms systems that forces us to reopen communication and dialogue unconditionally.
Russian President Putin proposed in the past the creation of an anti-missile defence system for Europe. Regular meetings on this topic are held up to now. It is a topic for the dialogue between Russia and NATO. Even the creation of joint Russian and American anti-missile defence and also the establishment of a joint Russian and NATO system were discussed. Why has the US set out a different way? Does it want to wind Russia up or ignore its interests and anxiety?
That‛s why the stances of German political representatives should be valued. Among the most frequent reactions are: “The questions concerning the anti-missile system must be thoroughly examined. They seriously touch the relation between Europe and NATO and thus Germany and Russia. As Europeans we cannot simply afford to gloss over Moscow‛s concern. Either way, dialogue is indispensable. We cannot countenance to damage the relation between Europe and Russia due to the anti-missile defence against Iran and North Korea.” (Edmund Stoiber, the Chairman of the conservative Christian Social Union). “I can see here considerable danger. The announcement by the Czech Republic, Poland and the United States that the deployment of missile defence system in Europe will lead to new arms race. The criticism by the Russian President should by taken seriously because it is legitimate. Germany took over the chair in European Union. It means that Angela Merkel has to deal also with this issue.” (Guido Westerwelle, the Chairman liberal party of Free Democrats). “We must talk to each other and not shove missiles under our noses.” “That is not an answer relevant for the future, in this way, we can quickly return back to the era of the Cold War. We need dialogue instead of sable-rattling even if may stumble across some bottlenecks during the talks.” (Kurt Beck, the Chairman of the Social Democratic Party of German). “Europe mustn‛t follow the prerogative and expansive security policy of G.W. Bush. The issue must be talked over in the European Council because it is central for the EU. If we don‛t notice individual approach like the willingness of the Czech Republic, Poland a Great Britain to deploy missiles, our goal of a cohesive EU foreign policy will remain as good as lost.” (Martin Schulz, the member of the Social Democratic Party of Germany, MP in German Federal Parliament).
The German Minister of Foreign Affairs Steinmeier has told in connection with this matter: “The ABM system can be neither a reason nor a pretext for a first leg of armament. The basis of permanent peace, however, is not military intimidation but the readiness for cooperation.”
Other critical statements were made by the President of France, from the side of Austria and Luxembourg and the former German Chancellor Schröder. It was not until the second half of March 2007 that the supreme representatives of the United States introduced initiatives towards similar discussion on the ABM in Europe, the offers of visiting the US ABM facilities and cooperation also with Russia.
Missiles and also anti-missiles express and reflect in-depth political linkage and the condition of a security environment. In relation to them we have the chance either to register this development passively or to look for our active position within. The wider and efficient the cooperation and understanding also as regards missiles among countries with common goals are, the more will the danger of their abuse and additional armament sink.
Is it conceivable to legitimately surmise that by the extension of a part of the US ABM into Europe we will “kill two birds by one stone”? Will be affected on one level officially and really North Korea and Iran but on another level unintentionally Russia and China?
The US approach is understandable to a certain degree, not only in the area of anti-missile defence with respect to the American historical development, i.e. traditional isolationalism (a doctrine by Monroe from 1823 about America for Americans refusing Europe to meddle in American affairs), but later the belief into own power so typical of every American which lead to the policy of unilateralism in the end. From the perspective of the rapidly changing world and the onset of multilateralism, this approach is outdated to a certain extent and doesn‛t reflect real conditions. In this day and age, neither the military and political nor the economic resources will be sufficient in the case of a single power centre. It isn‛t based on moral and legal fundaments of the modern civilisation. From the point to view of the United States, however, it is secured in the United Nations by the veto right which is nowadays used solely in the United States.
Has the time for a change within the United States come and thus the return to the principles of Foundig Fathers and the original meaning of the name that America as a symbol of hope devoted to the world?!
The basic principle of integrity and indivisibility of international security is cunning wisdom: “The security of one man is the security of all men.” Down the history, the severest danger for the world peace have always been the strongest military states and not marginal rebels of regional importance.
The solution of world issues lies not on the pilot board of the “warmakers” but on the round table of the “peacemakers”.
Unfortunately, these associations hint rather the basic argument of Mackinder‛s geopolitics which still holds true: “Great geographical realities are backward: mainland power against naval power, inland against borderland, centre against periphery…” It seems that Russia has grasped it the same way like the US has done!
I think that the US has not chosen a rational, affective and cooperating way of planning the extension of its anti-missile defence into Europe. Therefore it has stirred a whole series of negative statements, or rather, reactions not only from Russian side but also from the side of some old (western) EU and NATO members. The question arises, why has the United States chosen such an attitude?
(Author is a former Chief of General Staff of the Slovak Army.)