The Mediterranean island of Cyprus is standing on a crossroad. Many believe the year of 2008 is a crucial milestone in determining the future of the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots. These bold expectations are underpinned in the good news that after four years of deadlock, negotiations between the two communities were kicked off once again. Both leaders, i.e. the newly elected Greek Cypriot president Demetris Christofias as well as the Turkish Cypriot president Mehmet Ali Talat have expressed their will to work towards a bi-zonal and bi-communal federation, i.e. to bring to life the idea of a unified island.
However, there is also bad news. After five rounds of negotiations, the two sides have hardly moved on any of the persisting differences. Hence, despite the positive shift to start peace talks and even conduct some symbolical proximity steps, there is still a dilemma whether Christofias and Talat are any closer to cracking the Cyprus nut and thus making a significant landmark in the history of the island.
Moreover, outcome of their meetings will have a crucial impact on the accession process of Turkey to the EU. According to the official information on the website of the Commission for enlargement, talks with Ankara have been frozen since December 2006 “due to the Turkish failure to apply to Cyprus the Additional Protocol (1) to the Ankara Agreement” (2). Surely, the events in 2006 led to Ankara’s non-compliance with provisions under which it was due to extend customs union to Republic of Cyprus. However, the story behind the suspension is more complicated. What is simply labeled as a “Turkish failure to cooperate” was actually a consequence of stubbornness of more player, that are actively involved in the search for a comprehensive solution of the island’s partition. If there is no shift with respect to the Cyprus stalemate and hence with respect to Turkey’s homework under the Additional Protocol, Brussels is not willing to start negotiations with Ankara in at least eight out of 35 chapters of the acquis communautaire. Opening and closure of all chapters is a sine qua non for all candidate states.
Shipwrecking of Annan Plan
In April 2004 the last effort to put the two Cypriot communities together ended in fiasco. In a referendum that served as a constitutional act, the Greek Cypriots rejected a plan for unification drafted under the auspices of UN – Annan Plan V. The document proposed a bi-zonal and bi-communal federation based on a power sharing principle roughly derived from the population ratio (3). Even thought the Turkish Cypriots voted in favor of the Plan, the island has stayed divided, because the proportion of the Greek Cypriot vs. Turkish Cypriot pools was: 75.8% “no” vs. 64,9% “yes” (4).
On the top of that, the (Greek) Republic of Cyprus entered the EU only a couple of days later. EU chose not to condition the accession of the island on conflict settlement – a major diplomatic mistake indeed. “The Commission must envisage the possibility of the failure of the inter-communal talks to produce a political settlement… Should this eventuality arise… the situation should be reassessed in view of the positions adopted by each party in the talks”(5), said the Commission in 1993 in her response to Republic of Cyprus’s application for EU membership. However, the events of 2004 indicate that the respected institution did not really follow its own words. It does not seem like it did reassess the situation in view of the positions adopted by Greek Cypriots vis-à-vis Turkish Cypriots. Instead, it punished the later ones by imposing an embargo upon them – a response to their willingness to unify. On the other hand it rewarded the Greek Cypriots by granting them EU citizenship for having caused the shipwrecking of the Annan Plan.
One of the reasons why the Greek Cypriots dared to vote against unification was that they knew they were going to become EU citizens regardless of the referenda outcome. They were not very keen on the idea of a federation. The referendum was held on April 24, 2004, their country officially became a member state of EU as soon as of May 1, 2004. Possibility for this appalling scenario existed ever since the European Council decided in 1999 in Helsinki that “if no settlement has been reached by the completion of accession negotiations, the Council’s decision on accession will be made without the above being a precondition” (6). Hence, even though it was initially believed the accession process would catalyze the way towards a comprehensive settlement, it did not. Once, a carrot was offered without a stick, the logic of catalyst was out of game. Greek Cypriots dared to say “no” to Annan Plan because they were being encouraged by ex-president Tassos Papadopoulos, who run a huge “no campaign” and repeatedly defended his case by stating: “I was given a internationally recognized state. I am not going to give back ‘a Community’” (7).
The situation in the North was completely different. The Turkish Cypriot ex-leader Rauf Denktash also publicly opposed the unification plan, but the Turkish Cypriots dared not to follow him. For them unification represented a way out of isolation. Paradoxically, their “yes” in referenda, accompanied by a Greek Cypriot “no”, led to an ever-deeper isolation of the North. According to Protocol No. 10, which is attached to the Accession Treaty of the Republic of Cyprus “the application of the acquis shall be suspended in those areas of the Republic of Cyprus in which the Government of the Republic of Cyprus does not exercise effective control,” (8) i.e. territory of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) proclaimed in 1983. Even though Brussels promised as early as in 2004 to lift the embargo, it never did. “On 7 July 2004 the Commission presented the proposal for a direct trade regulation and for a financial aid regulation. The former, which offered a preferential regime for products originating in Northern Cyprus and entering directly (meaning not via the Green Line) into common customs territory, has not been adopted as a result of fierce opposition form the government of the Republic of Cyprus” (9). Thus, TRNC is still highly dependant on Turkey, the only country in the whole world that has recognized it so far – a contradiction to UN Security Council’s resolution SC 541(1983) (10), which calls upon all states not to do so.
The dependency of the Turkish Cypriots is clearly evident also in terms of water scarcity. The summer of 2008 was definitely one of the driest summers the island has ever experienced. Both communities have received water supplies by their respective motherlands, i.e. Turkey and Greece. Greece opted for sending the drinking water by tankers, whereas Turkey decided to build an underwater pipeline, construction of which is due to be launched in 2009. “If there is the demand, we could provide water for our neighbors as well, including south Cyprus” (11) a Turkish Cypriot environmental official Durali Elal said. Water scarcity and draughts are serious issues and they have implications on the important agricultural sector on the island. Some diplomats hope the trouble with water supplies would eventually evolve into some kind of “water diplomacy”. However, for the time being, the water scarcity only underlines the fact that the communities do everything separately and do not help each other.
“The Turks estimate that direct flights from Europe – and the hordes of tourists they would deliver to area beaches – could bring in as much as €1.5 billion per year for northern Cyprus… [However] the Cypriots have blocked the deal in the European Council” (12), and such a thing has not happen just once so far. The ex-Greek Cypriot Foreign Minister, George Lillikas explained very clearly why they keep on blocking any possible financial aid for the North: “What do they [Turkish Cypriots] want – to get the money or assistance to create a separate state?” (13)
The embargo under provisions of Protocol No. 10 does not cover only the finances. The Turkish Cypriots cannot enjoy any of the four freedoms usually granted upon country’s accession, i.e. the free flow of goods, services, people and capital. The application for the EU membership was submitted on behalf of the whole island, but the Turkish Cypriots are just de facto EU citizens. Even the language they speak, i.e. one of the official languages of the Republic of Cyprus – Turkish, was not made an official language of the EU, because the Greek Cypriot government did not ask for it. Moreover, it is sometimes argued the EU membership of the Republic of Cyprus in the EU is unlawful because according to the Treaty of Guarantee (14) “any form of the union, economic or political, of part or the whole of Cyprus to any organization where both Greece and Turkey are not members, was prevented” (15). Four years after the accession of Cyprus, the Turkish Cypriots are still left out in limbo. EU has not been working on ending their great isolation and legal non-existence. Yet the Protocol No. 10 philanthropically states “the accession of Cyprus to the European Union shall benefit all Cypriot citizens and promote civil peace and reconciliation” (16).
The story behind: two sides – one side
The Greek Cypriots argue accession of the divided island was right and just. The former Minister of Foreign Affairs Lillikas commented in this respect: “Had we not been allowed in because of the Turkish invasion, it would have been like punishing us for being punished by Turkey… The origin of the problem is that there is an occupation” (17). Here he refers to the events of 1974, when Turkey intervened and sent troops to Cyprus under its right granted by Treaty of Guarantee (1960), which is still in force today and is of constitutional power. According to the provisions under the Treaty, all the guarantor powers, i.e. Turkey, Greece and United Kingdom, have right to act if the constitutional order in the Republic of Cyprus is threatened. The Turkish soldiers were sent to Cyprus in order to stop a Greek Cypriot coup driven by a Greek military dictatorship in 1974. The troops are present there even today. The Greek Cypriots perceive this as an illegal invasion and a long-running occupation.
On the other hand, the Turkish Cypriots argue the conflict started years earlier – already in 1963, when there was a constitutional breakdown and collapse of the power-sharing principle, according to which both communities, i.e. the Greek Cypriots as well as the Turkish Cypriots are always to be present in all governmental bodies of the Republic of Cyprus. Ever since the Turkish Cypriots were ejected from their posts in 1963, their seats have remained vacant. The whole international community, that recognizes the republic, is overseeing this “little” constitutional discrepancy. In the event of inter-communal violence that followed after the breakdown, the United Nations created a Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus. Even today, the blue helmets control the Green Line that cuts the island into two parts, i.e. the North, where the Turkish Cypriots dwell and the South, where the Greek Cypriots have their homes. Despite the existence of two different points of view on how the Cyprus problem was triggered, the Greek Cypriot story dominates over the Turkish Cypriot one. In the international arena, the former narrative is well known because the Republic of Cyprus’s representatives are of Greek Cypriot origin only. The Turkish Cypriots thus have to face a mission impossible on an every day basis, i.e. to inform about their case. In this sphere they have no choice but to rely on their Turkish colleagues.
Cyprus and the EU – Turkey relations
There are many reasons why Ankara keeps itself involved in the Cyprus question up to a high degree. First of all, according to the Treaty of Guarantee, Turkey is one of the three powers that secure the very existence of the Republic of Cyprus. Hence, Turkey does recognize the Republic of Cyprus as such, but it does not recognize its government, which claims to represent all the people dwelling on the island even though the governmental posts of the Turkish Cypriots have been vacant for more than forty year. Moreover, Turkey was asked by the EU to play an active part in the Cyprus talks. At the Dublin summit in 1996 the European Council urged Ankara “to use its influence to contribute to a solution in Cyprus in accordance with UN Security Council resolutions” (18). This particular sentence is of high importance. It triggered an ever-deeper linkage of two diametric elements, i.e. Cyprus settlement and Turkish quest for membership in the EU. As a consequence of that, ten years later Cyprus became one of the major stumbling blocks to the Turkish quest for EU membership.
It is written in the Negotiating framework for Turkey (2005) that Commission will evaluate “Turkey’s continued support of efforts to achieve a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem within the UN framework… and progress in the normalization of bilateral relations between Turkey and all EU Member States, including the Republic of Cyprus” (19). Would this sentence be part of a Negotiating Framework for Cyprus and would the EU press on Cyprus to unite in this way, such a condition would make sense. However, Brussels is going to measure progress on an issue, in which there are multiple parties involved. Hence, the dilemma cannot be resolved by a good will of Ankara itself. This fact undermines the worthiness of such a condition and the second European attempt to “help out” with Cyprus settlement, surely lacked a lot of logic. The only logic that can be found behind such a decision is that all the main participants in the conflict except for Turkey are already member states of EU. As a consequence of that, Turkey is the only player, which can be theoretically pushed by Brussels under the strategy of carrot and a stick. However, the events of 2006 showed such a crippled strategy did not work in practice either.
Suspension of accession talks
Turkey signed (but not ratified) the Additional Protocol to Ankara Agreement in belief the embargo put on TRNC will be lifted as it had been promised by the European Council on 26 April 2004. The Greek Cypriots argued the opening of ports and airports in the North would serve as a de facto recognition of TRNC. Ankara perceived the opening of its ports and airports to traffic bearing Greek Cypriot flags in the same way. That is why a declaration by Turkey was attached to the Additional Protocol. The document explains that the opening of a free market with the Republic of Cyprus cannot be interpreted as a de facto recognition. Since it was attached to the Additional Protocol, EU responded in order to prevent the declaration from being part of the acquis communautaire. In a contra-declaration, Brussels proclaimed, “recognition of all Member States is a necessary component of the accession process” (20).
The deadline for adoption of provision under the Additional Protocol was coming up towards the end of 2006. However, the embargo was still not lifted as it had been promised. “So long as the Turkish Cypriots remain isolated, we will not open our ports and airports. If the (EU) negotiations halt, then let them halt,” (21) the Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan said. Any other position would be very likely discarded by the Turkish public, because the Turks are quick to accuse their government of “selling Cyprus”. The Finnish Presidency decided to take an active role and proposed a solution. “Under the proposal, the Turkish Cypriots would have to relinquish the deserted Varosha district of the divided city of Famagusta. In return for such an agreement the EU would allow free trade with northern Cyprus. Turkey would also be expected to open its ports to Cypriot ships” (22). However, the Turkish Cypriots did not find the offer balanced. What they really needed was the opening of an airport, not just of a port, because it is tourism that would give a major boost to their economy. It is hard to imagine any tourists coming for holiday on a boat. As a response to the Finish proposal “Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan proposed to open one seaport and an airport. For EU Commission President José Manuel Barroso… this was seen as a “very constructive” step” (23). However, it was not found constructive enough from the point of view of the Greek Cypriots. At the end of the day, no shift in the stalemate occurred, i.e. neither ports nor airports were opened and no embargo was lifted, either. In December “Council decided in particular to suspend negotiations on eight chapters relevant to Turkey’s restrictions as regards the Republic of Cyprus, and will not close the other chapters, until it fulfils its commitments under the Additional Protocol to the EU-Turkey association agreement, which extended the EU-Turkey customs union to the ten member states, including Cyprus” (24). Hence, only one year after the accession talks were opened, they were stalled because of Cyprus problem. However, not only eight chapters were frozen as it is usually presented, but also the whole negotiation process is very slow in general. For instance, throughout the year 2007 Ankara managed to open no more than three chapters. That is why the project director for Turkey/Cyprus at International Crisis Group Hugh Pope argues, “if you are going to fix the relations between Turkey and Europe, the Cyprus issue is the key to fixing it” (25). That is why the ongoing negotiations about the island will shape not only the future of Cyprus, but also the EU – Turkey relations.
No other chance like this?
The hopes for unification of Cyprus have risen ever since Demetris Christofias was elected president of the Republic of Cyprus in February 2008 and started peace talks with the Turkish Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali Talat. The same Greek Cypriots, who followed the former president and hardliner Tassos Papadopoulos in the 2004 referenda, voted him out of the presidential chair four years later. Even though Papadopoulos stayed behind the more successful candidates in the first round by only a couple of thousand votes, it can be considered as a positive shift in the attitudes of the Greek Cypriot public. According to Natalie Tocci “while the Greek Cypriots are certainly not drawn to a federal settlement, they are evidently not content with the status quo either, first and foremost because of the deep sense of insecurity” (26), which is caused by the presence of the Turkish soldiers in the island. Still Christofias’ winning hit was not that pompous. Having won only in the second round on February 24, 2008, he now needs to pay back to his supporters. He was able to get into the office “because DIKO (Democratic Party) as well as the nationalist EDEK (Movement for Social Democracy) and Green Party backed his candidacy… In exchange for their support, these parties were assured a worthy recompense in terms of ministerial seats and negotiating approaches in the Cyprus problem. More specifically DIKO outlined no less than 18 principles to be followed by the government composed of AKEL (Progressive Party of Working People led by Christofias), DIKO, EDEK and Green Party in an eventually resumed peace process… DIKO declared it would act as ‘guarantor’… assuring that no agreement resembling the Annan Plan would be accepted” (27). Thus Tocci concludes: “while representing historically the warmest partners of the Turkish Cypriots, AKEL and Christofias are not necessarily the best for a solution” (28).
Despite this, the international community welcomed the election of Christofias very warmly. It is more or less believed that “If Christofias and Talat cannot solve the [Cyprus] issue, who can?” (29) Surely, Christofias keeps on showing his positive attitude by saying nice things like: with Talat “we will have Cypriot coffee together” (30). In the same tone he announced in October 2008 “the cancellation of the five-day Greek Cypriot military exercise,” (31) which is conducted on regular basis every year. The Turkish (Cypriot) side responded in the same way and these actions are supposed to ease the atmosphere at the negotiating table. However, a statement by Christofias only a couple of days after cancellation of the exercises indicates that despite the symbolical confidence building measures – for example the opening of the Ledra Street Crossing in Nicosia in April 2008 or the cancellation of the Greek Cypriot vis-à-vis Turkish Cypriot “military games” in October 2008 – the positions have not been really softened. “We are not pleased to hear that a country occupying part of the Republic of Cyprus and breaching the human rights of the Cypriots has become a member of the Security Council,” (32) the Greek Cypriot President said when the non-permanent members were announced.
The question of security architecture of the island is on the list of the complicated issues to be solved. The size of the Turkish garrison on the island is “variously estimated at between 25 000 and 43 000. It [Turkey] insists on the right to a permanent garrison of 650, as foreseen in the 1960 Treaty of Alliance” (33). The presence of the Turkish troops makes the Turkish Cypriots feel more secure, while at the same time it makes Greek Cypriots feel threatened. That is also why the latter ones have an agreement with Greece – “a joint defense doctrine that sees ‘any attack on Cyprus as being tantamount to an attack on Greece’” (34). On the top of that, the guarantor system established by the Treaty of Guarantee still makes the island bound by external powers. This needs to be reassessed during the new negotiations if a democratic sovereign state is to be established. To reach a compromise on the security issue is more difficult because the acknowledgement of Ankara is needed. The Turkish Cypriots cannot themselves command the Turkish troops.
The same holds true for the issue of property settlement – a cooperation of Ankara is of crucial importance. Here the “main problem is the incompatibility between the Turkish Cypriot desire to retain a strong majority in their state and the generally accepted fact that 78 per cent of property in the area they control was owned by Greek Cypriots in 1974…. The Turkish Cypriots say the figure is 63.8 percent. The Turkish Cypriots claim 22 percent of the land in the South, while Greek Cypriots say the figure is 13,9 per cent” (35). Besides this there is also the question of the so-called settlers, i.e. immigrants from Turkey. The Greek Cypriots argue the ratio of the Turkish immigrants to native Turkish Cypriots is as high as 2 : 1 (36). “There are no reliable figures for the numbers of Turkish Cypriots who have left the island in recent years… As they leave, mainland Turks have been encouraged by the government to settle in their place and many Turkish Cypriots believe they are now outnumbered on the island by the settlers” (37). However, several different estimations with lower numbers exist, as well. Important information is that “the Talat government is no longer naturalizing immigrants from Turkey, reversing the Denktash policy” (38). The population ratio used to play a significant role in terms of power sharing principles in the past. Any speculations about increasing the populations are thus perceived highly negatively.
Besides these outstanding differences, the question of statehood halts the negotiations the most. A member of one working group in the negotiations summarized it as following: “We both want different things. The Turkish [Cypriot] side really wants an independent sovereign state, but knows this wouldn’t be recognized. The Greek Cypriots want the whole island back, but cannot get it. We’re talking about a second-best solution for both of us… So we push for a confederation, they push for strong municipalities. Neither side is talking about a real federation yet” (39). Hence, after five rounds of inter-communal talks, “neither side has appeared to yield up positions which have kept Cyprus divided” (40). Some diplomats, who are involved in the talks, even start worrying and being skeptical. The agenda on the negotiating table suddenly looks tough now when the initial enthusiasm and cheering for newly elected Christofias is gone. One of the diplomats involved in the talks acknowledged it is “a bit of disappointment. Maybe we were a little too optimistic before” (41).
Hence, when we speak about the new shift in the Cyprus stalemate in general, the bad news seems to prevail over the good one. The Greek Cypriot president was quick to identify the cause of the deadlock in the talks. According to Christofias Turkish involvement is a major obstacle: “If they leave us alone, we can find a solution soon… With my friend Talat we speak Cypriot language, we can solve the problem… Unfortunately, we are dependent on the will of Turkey” (42). Well, Turkey is involved in the Cyprus issue because of its own national interests. That is undisputable. “In its support of the Turkish Cypriots, Turkey has specific security concerns which go beyond the welfare of the Turkish Cypriot community… Cyprus was commonly described as a natural ‘aircraft carrier’ or ‘control tower’ protecting Turkey against hostile Greek designs… Turkish establishment unanimously viewed Cyprus as key to Turkish security” (43). However, it must not be forgotten that Turkey is one of the guarantor powers and on the top of that Brussels called on Ankara to participate in the peace talks actively. Ankara showed its good will by fully supporting the Annan Plan in 2004 and by signing the Additional Protocol. Brussels, not Ankara, was the first one not to keep promises, when it did not lift the embargo imposed on the Turkish Cypriots. As a consequence of that the accession negotiations of Turkey with the EU have been frozen. Turkey has thus been paying a high price for having taking care of Cyprus problem. By saying that Turkey’s interest in the partition dilemma is the main and only obstacle on the way to solution, Christofias is playing a blame game. There always needs to be someone found responsible for failures. However, as it was showed, the devil is in the details, not in Turkey.
It seems that despite all the hopes that have risen high recently, no major breakthrough will be seen in Cyprus by the end of 2008. Surely, for the newly started peace talks to be successful, both communities have to leave the table equally unsatisfied. Hopefully it will be possible to see them leaving in this way soon.
(1) Under the Additional Protocol to Ankara Agreement, Turkey is due to extend its customs union with EU to all member states, i.e. even the new ones and thus also to the Republic of Cyprus. The Turkish ports and airports are closed to the vessels and aircrafts bearing the flag of the Republic of Cyprus.
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/candidate-countries/turkey/key_events_en.htm(3) It was approximately 70:30 whereas the population of Greek Cypriots to Turkish Cypriots was closer to 80:20.(4) Figures retrieved from: Akgun, Mensur – Gurel, Ayla – Hatay, Mete – Tiryaki, Sylvia: Quo vadis Cyprus? TESEV working paper, April 2005, p. 50.(5) Commission Opinion on the Application by the Republic of Cyprus for Membership, 30 June 1993.
http://www.cyprus.gov.cy/moi/pio/pio.nsf/All/326B0C4E37B5C67CC2256DC5002EAE86/$file/Avis%201993%20extracts.doc?OpenElement(6) Helsinki European Council, 10 – 11 December 1999, Presidency Conclusions, par. 9.
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/ACFA4C.htm(7) Papadopoulos in Akgun et al., p. 56.
(8) Protocol No. 10 on Cyprus, 23 September 2003, art 1(1).
(9) Brus, Marcel et al: A promise to keep: Time to end the international isolation of the Turkish Cypriots. TESEV publications, Foreign Policy Series – 7, Istanbul, June 2008, p. 52.
(10) UN SC Resolution 541(1983).
(11) Turkish Cypriots plan water pipeline from Turkey, Reuters, August 20, 2008.
(12) Hawley, Charles: Is Ankara gambling away its EU future?, Spiegel Online, International, March 11, 2006.
(13) Lilikas in Hughes, Kirsty: Turkey and the EU: Four Scenarios: From Train Crash to Full Steam Ahead,
Friends of Europe Report in association with Chatham House and the European Institute of the London
School of Economics, 2006, p. 18.
(14) There are three treaties, that were signed in 1960 as part of the Zurich-London Agreements when the Republic of Cprus was establishd: Treaty of Guarantee, Treaty of Alliance (both having constitutional power) and Treaty of Establishment.
(15) Ozturk, Ilhan – Sertoglu, Kamil – Kaptan, Ebru: Cyprus-EU Relations: Possible Scenarios For The
Future, MPRA Paper No. 257, 2006, p. 8.
(16) Protocol No. 10 on Cyprus.
(17) Hawley, Charles: Why should we adopt the Turkish culture? Interview with Cypriot Foreign Minister Yiorgos Lillikas, Spiegel Online International, May 4, 2007.
(18) Dublin European Council, 13 – 14 December 1996, Presidency Conclusions.
(19) General Affairs and External Relations Council, Negotiating Framework for Turkey,
Luxembourg, October 3, 2005.
(20) Declaration by the European Community and its Member States, Brussels, 21 September 2005, par. 2.
(21) Fronts between Turkey and EU harden over Cyprus, EurActive.com, June 19, 2006.
(22) Turkish Cypriot leader strogly disagrees with Finnish proposal on Cyprus, HLSINGIN Sanomat, November 8, 2006.
(23) An offer from Ankara, Spiegel Online International, November 12, 2006
(24) General Affairs and External Relations, 2770th Council Meeting, Brussels, 11 December 2006.
(25) Kiper, Cinar: Cyprus under Europeans’ radar, Turkish Daily News, October 14, 2008.
(26) Tocci, Nathalie: Two Cheers for Christofias! Is the glass half full or half empty in post-election Cyprus?, Centre for European Policy Studies, March 28, 2008.
(29) Turkmen, Ilter: What can come out of Christofias? Turkish Daily News, May 13, 2008.
(30) Cyprus leaders begin peace talks, BBC News, March 21, 2008.
(31) Cypriot leaders call off military exercises, Southeast European Times, October 14, 2008.
(32) Cyprus: Prezident vyjadril námietky voči tureckému kreslu v BR, SME, October 18, 2008.
(33) Reunifying Cyprus: The Best Chance Yet, Crisis Group Europe Report No. 194, June 23, 2008, p. 14.
(34) Ibidem, p. 14.
(35) Ibidem, p. 15.
(36) Number retrieved from Reunifying Cyprus: The Best Chance Yet, p. 16.
(37) Morgan, Tabitha: Turkish Cypriots fear ‚Turkification’, BBC news, December 11, 2003.
(38) Number retrieved from Reunifying Cyprus: The Best Chance Yet, p. 16.
(39) Ibidem, p. 12.
(40) Bahceli, Simon – Kambas, Michele: Diplomats worry at slow pace of Cyprus talks, International Herald Tribune, October 6, 2008.
(42) Cypriot President against Turkish “meddling”, EurActiv.com, June 20, 2008.
(43) Tocci, Nathalie: EU Accession Dynamics and Conflict Resolution: Catalyzing peace or Consolidating Partition in Cyprus? Ashgate, Hampshire, 2004, p. 31.