The so-called Armenian question has been heavily discussed in many countries all over the world recently. Some parliaments are even so active that they pass bills, which criminalize the denial of “Armenian genocide.” The Armenian question refers to the differences between Armenia and Turkey over what and how happened at the beginning of the 20th century on the territory of the dissolving Ottoman Empire.
Turkey acknowledges that a deportation, during which many Armenians died, did happen. However, “they view those deaths as part of the carnage which likewise took the lives of civilian Moslems” (1). In their point of view, the belligerent Armenians, who fought for their own independent state, were a political, not an ethnic, national, racial or religious group protected by the United Nations’ Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, which is a substantial international instrument dealing with the questions of genocide. Nevertheless, the Armenians and those, who have expressed a clear opinion on this chapter of Ottoman history via newly adopted legislative, argue that Ottoman Turks massacred Armenians “in a planned and systematic way… the number of Armenians who lost their lives… is one and a half million” (2). Turkey only acknowledges “several hundred thousand Armenians died of starvation and exposure” (3).
All individual genocide bills are politically motivated acts, which comprise a challenging ambition to substitute the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in one of its exclusive tasks. Because of the ever-growing number of unilateral parliamentary judgments on the late Ottoman history, the freedom of expression is restricted in many states and what once was a bilateral issue has grown up to international dimension. Anyway, it must not be forgotten that the freedom to discuss this issue is likewise restricted in Turkey, which tries to protect itself from the genocide allegations by restricting the freedom of expression. The fundamental right is currently hampered due to existence of Article 301 (4) of the Turkish Penal Code, according to which it is a crime to “insult Turkishness”. Turkey has declared its commitment to democracy a couple of decades ago. The process of consolidation has been rather successful so far and has been boosted further since Turkey applies to join the EU. As a part of the democratization process, a free reflection on history should be allowed.
Since there is a lack of judicial decision on the Armenian question, the political interpretation of the past provides for genocide allegations against Turkey in bilateral relations as well as on international and particularly also European level. There is thus an urgent need of a free discussion of the tabooed issue by the two main players, i.e. Turkey and Armenia. Otherwise, there is a threat of severe damage to their already strained relations. Most regrettable is that if the positions on both sides of the spectra, i.e. in Armenia and Turkey, are not going to change, the harmful consequences are likely to prevail over the much-needed normalization, which is hampered more whenever a new unilateral genocide bill is passed.
Demands of the European Parliament
European Parliament was among the first ones to recognize the events in 1915-1917 as genocide according to the United Nations’ Convention on Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (5). It passed its recommending resolution right after Turkey submitted its application for full membership to the Council of the European Union in 1987. The issue thus accompanies the Turkish file since the formal beginning of the state’s quest for membership, the successful accomplishment of which ranks among the top issues on Turkish foreign policy agenda. Given the conditional nature of the accession talks, the Armenian Diaspora figured out it would be beneficial to pursue the recognition of genocide also at the European level. In spite of its well-organized activities in Brussels, it has been rather unsuccessful so far – the clause on recognition does not appear in any of the legally binding EU texts. The discussions in Brussels do touch upon the Armenian question though. The waters are stirred especially by the strong demands of the European Parliament. As a consequence of that, some sui generis features of Turkish accession talks, e.g. the constant questioning of the European merits of Turkey or incorporation of the Cyprus question into the negotiating framework, are now supplemented with yet another topic.
The Article 4 of the Parliament’s 1987 resolution states that among other things also “the refusal of the present Turkish Government to acknowledge the genocide… [is an] obstacle to consideration of the possibility of Turkey’s accession to the Community” (6). This bill is not the only one aiming to create a precondition out of the Armenian claims. Similar references can be found in the following documents: “Morillon Report on Turkey’s Accession (2000), Gahrton Report on the South Caucasus (2002), Eurlings Report on Turkey’s Accession (2004), Brok Report on Turkey’s Accession (2005), Second Eurlings Report on Turkey’s Accession (2006)” (7). Despite the strong and long-term appeal, the recognition has not been legalized and Turkey is thus not obliged to acknowledge “Armenian genocide” before entering the EU. However, the efforts of parliamentarians do imply a hostile atmosphere among the Turkish authorities, who tend to take a softer stance than when the Cyprus problem is on table in Brussels for instance. Both topics are sensitive issues for Turkey, but the moderate temper is understandable. The recognition is mandatory only in the Cyprus case. Hence, the Armenian claim is not likely to create major stumbling blocks on Turkey’s way to the EU.
Finally in 2006, the Parliament reevaluated its position and “rejected the clause calling for the acknowledgement of the Armenian genocide a ‘precondition’ for Turkey’s EU accession” (8). It is still strongly recommended though. The report of Camiel Eurlings on Turkey’s progress towards Europe was passed by 429 votes, while 71 members were against and 125 absented. The clause on the recognition of the Armenian genocide was only dropped from the text of the Report by a late amendment proposed and supported mostly by the Socialists. A Dutch parliamentary Phili Claeys blames them because of playing a political game of selfish interests: “The Walloon Parti Socialiste… withdrew its support of recognition of the Armenian genocide due to the fear of losing votes among the ever-increasing Turkish electorate in Brussels, where elections are to be held in two weeks’ time” (9). Even though the Report was passed successfully, many Members of Parliament perceive it despise to Parliament’s former claims. “Parliament is eating its words, losing its memory and, even more seriously, losing sight of its duty to remember,” said Frédérique Ries from France (10).
The President of the Parliament Hans-Gert Pottering is of a different opinion. He said he was “not in favor of Armenian demands” (11). The Armenians are not giving up. Their president Robert Kocharian pressed for addition of a reference to “Armenian genocide denial” into the Progress Report on Turkey by paying a face-to-face visit to Pottering. He failed. Also the French-Armenian singer and permanent representative of Armenia to UNESCO “Charles Aznavour met the President Barroso in order to seek the recognition of the Armenian genocide” (12). The timing of his visit was highly calculative. He met Barroso in November 2005 as the accession talks with Turkey were due to open one month later. The Commissioner for Enlargement Olli Rehn is not in favor of the Armenian shuttle diplomacy either. “[He] made clear that recognition of the killings as genocide was not a condition for EU entry” (13). So did the President of the Commission in October 2007 after president Kocharian raised the very same question as Aznavour did before.
Policies in Member States
Despite the rather negative response from the high EU officials to the Armenian quest, the hopes of the Caucasian nation grew bigger in 2007, when the Council of the EU passed a decision on racism and xenophobia according to which “publicly condoned, denied or grossly trivilised crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes as defined in the Statute of the International Criminal Court ” (14) are to be punished in all member states. It is important to notice that this paragraph actually does not refer to the Armenian issue because it has never been acknowledged by the International Court of Justice as genocide. Interesting information is that eleven (15) out of twenty-seven countries have already passed national bills criminalizing the denial of “Armenian genocide”. The chain reaction triggered by the European Parliament’s resolution cautiously backed up by the efforts of Armenian Diaspora, was only stopped when the Government of Denmark refused to join the expanding club at the beginning of 2008 because according to it it “is a historical question that should be left up to the historians” (16). The Bulgarian Government refused to do so as well. However, the reason was not as altruistic as of Denmark. “Bulgaria’s Parliament has rejected similar motions [quest for recognition of the “Armenian genocide”] by the rightist opposition several times, allegedly because of the ethnic Turkish party Movement for Rights and Freedoms, which is a junior partner in the governing three-way coalition” (17).
The anger in Turkey grew when particularly one of the member states, i.e. France, passed a genocide bill at the end of 2006. The Commissioner for Enlargement Olli Rehn even feared that such an act “would damage Ankara’s dialogue with the Union instead of enhancing it” (18). It is no secret that the French President Nicolas Sarkozy is one of the toughest hardliners when it comes to the Turkish bid for membership. After the bill had been approved, the French president proclaimed that recognition of “Armenian genocide” must be laid down as a precondition for EU entry. France is a home to large Armenian Diaspora. Hence, the logic behind the parliamentary provision is clearly visible. In France, one has to be very careful when talking about history because they “punish any expression contrary to this allegation [i.e. denial of “Armenian genocide”] with one year in prison and a 45,000 euro fine” (19). There’s a restricted freedom of expression in France. Moreover, the President Sarkozy is surely keen on having yet another “decent argument” to keep Turkey out of the EU.
Finding the Right Way
Given the sensitive nature of the topic, the Turkish authorities the public opinion perceive the unilateral bills as a harsh insult. As was shown at the beginning there are major discrepancies in interpretation of the events by different sides, which is also the source of the conflict. However, in situations like this, the Article 9 of the UN Convention comes up with an elegant solution. All genocide disputes are to be settled by the ICJ, which is the only authority that possesses the needed capacity to rule in cases like this. Once the Court’s decision, which is usually underpinned by the investigations of distinguished commissions, is made, a country might ask for financial and territorial reprisals as well as for compensations for the descendants of the victims. Neither Turkey nor Armenia has asked the Court for opinion so far. One of the reasons might be that reparations are not what Armenia is searching for. Last year (2007) a distinguished Turkish think-tank TESEV reported on an Armenian visit and concluded that “what the Armenians are asking is an apology for their suffering, there is no territorial demand or demand for reparations from Turkey” (20). Since there is no compensation claim on the Armenian side, one might think there really is no need to submit the issue to the ICJ. The past and current politics however clearly indicate that such a need still exists and is actually urgent. The two main players are accusing each other of genocide denial/confirmation. Moreover, also third countries have joined the debate and Armenia has been seeking the accomplishment of its quest via the humiliation of the EU-Turkey relations. The pursuit of unilateral recognitions will by no means push Turkey even close to the desired acknowledgement, let alone apology. By this tactic Armenia only kills the possibility of establishing a dialogue with Turkey step by step.
Even the European Parliament, which is in favor of genocide recognition, understands that this is not the right way. That is why it “called on the Turkish authorities to facilitate the work of researchers, intellectuals and academics working on this question, ensuring them the access to the historical archives and providing them with all the relevant documents” (21). Surprisingly, the state which refused this option was Armenia. Armenian Foreign Affairs Minister Vartan Oskanian “rejected a call by Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan to set up a commission to study the events… He said talks on the issue remain impossible as long as Turkey’s penal code continues to criminalize any depiction of the mass killings as ‘genocide’ (22).” Oskanian conditioned the dialogue by removing the Article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code, which prevents a free discussion of many sensitive topics in Turkey, particularly of the Armenian question. Anybody who “insults Turkishness” is likely to be tried. Orhan Pamuk, the first Turkish writer to get a Nobel Prize, had to face “charges under Article 301 for comments he made during an interview he gave to a Swiss newspaper (Tages Anzeiger)… [He] stated: ‘30,000 Kurds and a million Armenians were murdered” (23). If the Turkish Government keeps its promises, the new draft version of the Article 301 will be due to enter Turkish Parliament soon. However, the proclaimed process is going on slowly. A couple of months ago, several high officials claimed that the draft would be voted on next week. Meanwhile, it seems that according to their timing the “next week” has not come yet. Moreover, “instead of the present, rather obscure, terminology: ‘abasing Turkishness’, the draft introduces the term ‘abasing the Turkish nation’. And instead of ‘Republic’ it qualifies it as the ‘Turkish Republic’” (24). Hence, even if submitted to the Parliament, the Article 301 would undergo just minor changes. Given the harsh critique in Turkish media and public, there is a hope that the new and mild proposal of 301 will be amended yet again before entering the Parliament and the argument of Minister Oskanian will cease to exist soon. Another issue is whether the archives can still be trusted, because they have been open to omissions, secret deletions and document demolition over a long period of time. The good news is that according to the UN Convention, the government of Turkey is by no means responsible for the genocide even if proved. Since genocide is classified, as a crime, one must sue particular individuals, not states, because crime is personal. This provides for expectations that one day the tabooed “g-issue” will be freely discussed in Turkey. However, still the best and moreover legal way to solve the dilemma is to submit the issue to the ICJ.
Quest for normalization?
Reconciliation of Turkey and Armenia is essential also because their strained relations are a problem of European dimension. The EU stresses that all of its member states should maintain friendly relations. Moreover, the Union has recently launched a new policy on Armenia. Since 2005, the state in Caucasus has been a part of the European Neighborhood Policy. One of the goals of this policy is that “The EU’s external borders will not become new dividing lines but the focus of enhanced co-operation” (25). Provided the EU keeps its promises and Turkey complies with the accession criteria, the eastern border of Turkey is to become an external border of the Union. However, it has been closed since 1993 (26). The Armenians even have the courage to lobby with respect to this issue in European institutions again. Their Foreign Affairs Minister Vartan Oskanian had a speech at the European Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee in October 2007 in which he “described Turkey’s closure of the border as a violation of the Copenhagen criteria” (27). It is a little bit odd that Oskanian called for opening of the border, which his country still refuses to recognize. The borders between these two states were set in 1921 by the Treaty of Kars the ratification of which is still pending in Armenia. However, the principle of international law provides that “the Republic of Armenia, as a successor state, automatically inherited all the treaties signed by the USSR. Hence the Treaty of Kars is legally in effect and there is no need to make any… declaration” (28). Whatever the border claims might be, the main reason why the border is closed is the unresolved Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The EU has already several times called upon Turkey to normalize its relations with Armenia, i.e. to open the border. At the same time it somehow forgot to mention that in order to comply with this requirement, some steps are needed also on the Armenian side, which still carries on the dubious tactic of shuttle diplomacy, through which it antagonizes Turkey.
Recognition of genocide has been an ultimate goal of every Armenian Government since 1991 when a Declaration of Independence of Armenia was issued. The Article 11 provides for official pursuit of the acknowledgement: “The Republic of Armenia stands in support of the task of achieving international recognition of the 1915 Genocide in Ottoman Turkey and Western Armenia” (29). Provided the nature of the tactic remains as contra productive as it is now, there will be also a discrepancy in the very text. The territory referred to as Western Armenia is actually territory of Eastern Turkey. Hence if the genocide issue is ever going to be submitted to the Court, the Armenians should think twice before formulating their question. This is not likely to happen since Armenia opted for a different way of accomplishing this mission. Deriving from the information collected, it is the Armenian Diaspora rather than the Armenian Government that is eager to pursue the world-wide recognition of the genocide. The pursuit of this goal is also psychological. If Turkey recognizes the genocide, Armenians might stop being afraid of their “dreadful neighbor”. However, the tactic chosen by Armenians is likely to lead them away from the desirable scenario.
The Diaspora is a lobby tool of essential importance. Main objective is to make sure that the number of countries that do recognize the genocide grows. In stark contrast to the response of EU officials to the Armenian lobby, this strategy has been rather successful when it comes to particular states. So far nineteen countries (30) have criminalized the denial of Armenian genocide, which was praised by the former Armenian Prime Minister Andranik Margarian: “We shall try to achieve our goal of genocide recognition through our Diaspora organizations, as was the case in Sweden, in Switzerland last year, to shape with their help an international opinion on Turkey” (31) It is not so hard to figure out what the preferred opinion on Turkey is like according to Armenian liking, since it is a country that has no diplomatic relations with Turkey, whose border with Turkey it does not recognize, a country that accuses Turkey of economic isolation caused by the border issue, and last but not least a country that perceives the Turks as perpetrators of the “first genocide of the 20th century”.
Instead of conducting a proposed dialogue on the sensitive question of genocide, Armenia conducts steps, which trigger greater hostility between it and Turkey. It is not difficult at all to predict that this will never ever lead to recognition of the genocide by the Turks. However, the newly elected Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan still thinks the growing number of genocide bills is essential to start a communication, because this tendency “is a key condition for preventing future genocides and consolidation of international security system in terms of stimulating civilizations dialogue” (32). Very interestingly, the Armenian quest for recognition was condemned by some of the distinguished Armenian authorities that seemed to understand the harming and contra productive consequences of such efforts. For example the “Turkish Armenians, and even the Patriarch of the Armenian church of Istanbul, have not welcomed the House resolution” (33) at the end of 2007.
Irritated Turkey acts
Turkish response to the growing number of genocide bills has international implications. Turkey is hard on Armenia as well as on other states that have recognized genocide. President Abdullah Gül said, “as long as Yerevan insists on continuing its efforts for the designation of the World War I era killings of Anatolian Armenians as “genocide” by the parliaments of third countries, it cannot expect any development concerning the normalization of relations between Armenia and Turkey.” Hence the relations between Turkey and Armenia suffer. Armenia wants recognition and thinks that the best way to accomplish this task is through third countries, i.e. by omitting a dialogue with Turkey. Turkey refuses to talk to Armenia unless it changes the tactic of its foreign policy.
Moreover, the relations of Turkey with third countries suffer due to Armenian shuttle diplomacy, as well. The Grand National Assembly of Turkey considers the “the adoption, for political purposes, of decisions by foreign parliaments regarding certain chapters of Ottoman-Armenians history which are still subject to discussion among world historians… as inappropriate, pointless, arbitrary and unjust acts and condemns them” (34). Turkey is, however, a player that does not finish with hollow words, but a player that really acts. For example, when the French Parliament passed the genocide bill “Turkey halted bilateral military exchanges and froze all reciprocal military visits and joint military exercises with France. Paris was barred from bidding for Turkish defense contracts” (35).
Also one of the biggest global players, the US, was given a hard time when the genocide bill was on table in the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House. Irritated Turkey might easily jeopardize major NATO operations in Iraq as well as Afghanistan because “the cargo hub at Incirlik Air Base serves both Iraq and Afghanistan. 74 per cent of air cargo into Iraq transits Incirlik” (36). Only a couple of days after the genocide bill was approved in the Foreign Affairs Committee, Turkish Parliament authorized the possibility of military incursion into Northern Iraq to combat the terrorist guerillas of outlawed Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). Since the approval, the Turkish forces have entered the territory several times. Deriving from this, once the spokesman for Azerbaijan’s Foreign Affairs Ministry Khazar Ibragim acknowledged that the “absence of control over Nagorno-Karabakh by Azerbaijan creates favorable conditions for PKK terrorists,” (37) Turkey might have yet another reason not to open its Western border and to keep its cold attitude towards Armenia, which is not likely to change its position with respect to Nagorno-Karabakh as well as to the Armenian question.
Way to go
In spite of the stalemate in Armenia-Turkey relations, foreign policy of the isolated Caucasian state is not likely to change. Even if there is a new government the pursuit of the recognition of genocide will still be legally underpinned in the Declaration of 1991 and thus also officially demanded via the tool of Armenian Diaspora. The latest presidential elections (2008) also showed that “all political parties… pursue[d] a “no compromise” policy on two crucial issues: Allegations of genocide and Nagorno-Karabakh” (38). Turkey is not likely to change its hard stance towards Armenia either. Unless the country shows at least a little bit of good will by letting a joint committee to investigate on the Armenian question, it is hard to imagine any shift in the bilateral relations. Instead of seeking normalization Armenia attacks one of the top issues of Turkish foreign policy by using its dubious tactic in the European institutions. Despite this, generally speaking “Armenia supports the integration. Turkey will be easier to predict once it enters the EU and that is very important for Armenia” (39).
At a first sight, Armenian question might look like a mere battle over words and proper naming of historical events, but the contrary is true. The consequences of the internationalization of the issue have obviously had a negative impact on relations between many players in the international arena. Worst of all is that the issue is misused for political calculations. Several officials were tempted to utilize such a possibility in their pursuit of selfish goals, e.g. to have allegations against Turkey (France), to try an obscure way of stopping the costly war in Iraq (the US), to pursue own political gains in upcoming elections (Walloon Socialist Party) or to confirm a traditionally negative attitude towards Turkey (Cyprus). Even though some countries do back Armenia in its pursuit of international recognition of genocide, the mourning is actually all what Armenia and these states share. There is no help for the isolated landlocked country in Caucasus. The only turning point might be the new EU policy, which also aims to lessen the Russian influence in the region and also the Armenian dependency on Russia.
The Armenian issue is a sensitive topic that needs to be resolved in order to provide grounds for reconciliation between the Turks and the Armenians and a place for reflection on the past underpinned in the objective reality. Due to the problems presented in this paper and due to emotions, such a task of final labeling of the events of 1915 – 1923 as genocide or non-genocide has to be left for ICJ. The ambivalences over the Armenian issue have been successfully used for political purposes by different states and individuals. The (re)interpretation of history for political ends is neither moral nor does it prevent further violation of human rights. If the genocide did happen, there is no need to put the “g-word” in inverted commas anymore. Once the Court approves such a decision underpinned in historical reality, the unilateral genocide bills will be legitimate.
2)The Armenian Issue in Nine Questions and Answers, Foreign Policy Institute, Ankara, 1989., p.1.
3) Amberin Zaman: Turkish Leader Calls for Study of Genocide Debate. Los Angeles Times, 3 September 2005. Available online at: http://www.genocide1915.info/research/view.asp?ID=40, access 13 January 2008.
4) The Article 301 reads as follows: 1. Public denigration of Turkishness, the Republic or the Grand National Assembly of Turkey shall be punishable by imprisonment of between six months and three years. 2. Public denigration of the Government of the Republic of Turkey, the judicial institutions of the State, the military or security structures shall be punishable by imprisonment of between six months and two years. 3. In cases where denigration of Turkishness is committed by a Turkish citizen in another country the punishment shall be increased by one third. 4. Expressions of thought intended to criticize shall not constitute a crime. For full reference see: Document – Turkey: Article 301 is a threat to freedom of expression and must be repealed now! Amnesty international, 1 December 2005. Available online at: http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/EUR44/035/2005/en/c8f87ee9-a303-
11dc-8d74-6f45f39984e5/eur440352005en.html, access: 10 March 2008.
5) Genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. For full reference see the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted by the United Nations’ General Assembly resolution 260 A (III) of 9 December 1948. Available online athttp://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/p_genoci.htm, access: 19 February 2008.
6) Resolution on a political solution to the Armenian question. European Parliament Doc. A2-33/87, 18 June 1987. Available online at: http://www.armenian-genocide.org/Affirmation.152/current_category.7/
affirmation_detail.html, access: 17February 2008.
7) Nicolas Tavitian and ICKVE: Armenians inside Europe. A practical guide to the European Unionfor Armenians in Europe, 2007. Available online at: http://www.insideeurope.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Logos/Armenians_Inside_
Europe_-__A_Practical_Guide_to_the_European_Institutions.pdf, access: 19 February 2008.
8) Report on Turkey‘s progress towards accession. Resolution of the European Parliament INI/2006/2118, 27June 2006. Available online at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/FindByProcnum.do?lang=2&procnum=
INI/2006/2118, access: 19 February 2008.
9) Procedure file. European Parliament INI/2006/2118, 27 September 2006. Available online at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/FindByProcnum.do?lang=2&procnum=INI/
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11) Cansu Camlibel: Frattini sheds light on genocide division in Brussels. Turkish Daily News, 17 October 2007. Available online at: http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=86116, access: 18 February 2008.
12) President Barroso chats to singer Charles Aznavour at the Commission. European Commission’s Photo Gallery, 29 November 2005. Available online at: http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/president/multimedia/photo/cultural/
clanok_en.htm, 16 February 2008.
13) France warned over “genocide” law. BBC News, 9 October 2006. Available online at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6033713.stm, access: 18 February 2008.
14) Framework decision on racism and Xenophobia. Council of the European Union 8665/07,19 April 2007. Available online at: http://126.96.36.199/search?q=cache:sXvZcLLeMkIJ:http://www.consilium.europa.
crimes&hl=sk&ct=clnk&cd=1&gl=sk&client=firefox-a, access: 19 January 2008.
15) Belgium, Cyprus, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia and Sweden.
16) Denmark does not recognize Armenian genocide claims: Minister. Turkish Daily News, 12 January 2008. Available online at: http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=93456, access 13 January 2008.
17) Turkey Blocks EU Funds over Bulgaria’s recognition of Armenian Genocide, 10 March 2008. Available online at: http://www.novinite.com/view_news.php?id=91136, access: 10 March 2008.
18) Rehn: Adoption of Armenian genocide bill in France will damage EU-Ankara dialogue, 10 October 2006. http://www.armtown.com/news/en/pan/20061010/19605/, access: 19 February 2008.
19) Sylvia Tiryaki: Travelers to France, beware! Turkish Daily News, 16 October 2006. http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=56785, access: 11 January 2008.
20) The Normalization of Turkish-Armenian Relations, Armenia Visit. TESEV Foreign Policy Program, 11 December 2006. http://www.tesev.org.tr/eng/events/armeniasreport.pdf, access: 17 February 2008.
21) Report on Turkey‘s progress towards accession. European parliament resolution, 27 September 2006. Available online at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/FindByProcnum.do?lang=2&procnum=INI/
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22) Ahto Lobjakas: Armenia: Foreign Minister Appeals for EU Pressure on Turkey. Radio Free Europe, 9 October 2007. Available online at: http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2007/10/BB688E21-C304-4AA0-A712-
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23) Turkey: Article 301 is a threat to freedom of expression and must be repealed now! Amnesty International USA, 1 December 2005. Available online at: http://www.amnestyusa.org/document.php?lang=e&id=ENGEUR440352005, access: 13 January 2008.
24) Yusuf Kanli: 301 reform? Forget it! Turkish Daily News, 9 January 2008. Available online at: http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=93160, access: 10 March 2008.
25) Commission Staff Working Paper. Commission of the European Communities. 2 March 2005. Available online at: http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/armenia_country_report_2005_en.pdf, 16 February 2008.
26) Turkey was among the first countries to recognize Armenia‘s independence in 1991. The diplomatic relations between these countries are frozen since 1993. The very same year, Turkey closed its border with Armenia as an act of solidarity with its ally Azerbaijan that fights with Armenia over the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh.
27) Cem Oguz: The Turkish-Armenian border. Turkish Daily News, 23 January 2008. Available online at: http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=94380, 14 February 2008.
28) The Normalization of Turkish-Armenian Relations. TESEV Foreign Policy Program, 11 December 2006. Available online at: http://www.tesev.org.tr/eng/events/armeniasreport.pdf, access: 17 February 2008.
29) Declaration of Independence. Supreme Council of the Republic of Armenia, 23 August 1990. Available online at:http://www.armeniaforeignministry.com/htms/doi.html, access: 11 January 2008.
30) Eleven EU member states plus Argentina, Canada, Lebanon, Russia, Switzerland, Uruguay, the Vatican and Venezuela.
31) Prime Minister A. Margarian meets members of Armenian community in Sweden. Government of the Republic of Armenia, 29 January 2004. Available online at: http://www.gov.am/enversion/premier_2/primer_home.htm?mat=498, access: 16 February 2008.
32) Prime Minister Andranik Margarian’s address on the occasion of Remembrance of Genocide Victims Day. Government of the Republic of Armenia, 24 April 2004. Available online at: http://www.gov.am/enversion/premier_2/primer_home.htm?mat=696, access: 19 February 2008.
33) A resolution too far. The Economist, 18 October 2007. Available online at: http://www.economist.com/opinion/displaystory.cfm?story_id=9988749&CFID
0129915069ED0E5C, access: 12 January 2008.
34) Declaration by the Turkish Grand National Assembly, 13 April 2006. Available online at: http://www.turkishembassy.org/clanok.php?option=com_content&task=view&
id=515&Itemid=494, access: 18 February 2008.
35) Soner Caqaptay: Armenian Genocide Folly. Washington Times, 22 February 2007. Available online at: http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC06.php?CID=1031, access: 19 February 2008.
36) Anthony H. Cordesman & Arleigh A. Burke: The Armenian Genocide Bill and the Turkish Reaction in Iraq. Center for Strategic and International Studies, 15 December 2007. Available online at: http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/071015_genocidebillturkishreaction.pdf, access: 17 February 2008.
37) Khazar Ibrahim: Absence of control over Nagorno-Karabakh by Azerbaijan creates favorable conditions for PKK terrorists, 16 February 2008. Available online at: http://today.az/news/politics/43153.html, access: 18 February 2008.
38) Vercihan Ziflioglu: Armenians go to the polls. Turkish Daily News, 16 February 2008. Available online at: http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=96583, access: 19 February 2008.
39) Juraj Marušiak: The Armenians support the entry of Turkey into the European Union: An interview with the freelance Armenian ethnologist and analyst Tigran Matosyan. Despite Borders, 22 June 2007. Available online at: /clanky/data/upimages/matosyan.pdf, access: 11 March 2008